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COMPULSORY JOINDER OF PARTIES
IN CIVIL ACTIONS*

John W. Reedf
III.

COMPULSORY JOINDER PRINCIPLES IN AcnoN, cont'd.
C.

In Cases Involving Interests in Real Property
(Necessary Equals Indispensable)

OMPULSORY joinder cases involving interests in land display
one peculiar and important characteristic: there is almost
never any need in the state courts to wrestle with the question of
whether a person is indispensable as distinguished from necessary.
One hastens to add that this attribute of land cases appears to have
gone largely unnoticed, but it exists none the less. It arises out of
the fact that in a suit involving real property it is never impossible
for the court to obtain jurisdiction over all persons interested
therein to an extent which will enable the court to adjudicate controversies over these interests. Constructive service of process
based on the court's power over the res within its jurisdictional
confines will reach out to everyone having or claiming an interest
in the res.182
Thus, in this field a plaintiff ordinarily cannot complain that
if he is not permitted to go ahead in A's absence he will be foreclosed from all relief. It may be difficult, more expensive, slower,
more annoying; but it will not be impossible. "Necessary" parties
are understood to be those who ought to be present if the court is
to do complete justice but who nevertheless may be excused if the
court is unable to obtain jurisdiction over them. Such inability

C

• This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. The first
instalment was published in the January 1957 issue [55 MICH. L. REv. 327].-Ed.
t Profeswr of Law, University of Michigan; A.B. 1939, William Jewell College, LL.B.
1942, Cornell University, LL.M. 1949, Columbia University; co-author, Blume and Reed,
Cases and Statutes on Pleading and Joinder (1952).-Ed.
182 Smith v. Smith, 123 Minn. 431, 144 N.W. 138 (1913). Cf. Morgan's Heirs v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. (15 U.S.) 290 at 298n. (1817); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 8c Trust
Co., 339 U.S. l!06 (1950).
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cannot well occur in land actions in state co1:1rts. To say that a
person "ought" to be present is, virtually, to say that he must, since
there can be no excuse of inability to cite him in.183 Thus, if it is
concluded that there may be some adverse effect on the interest of
the absent person, or if for any other reason-such as preventing a
duplication of litigation-it seems wise to require joinder, then
joinder must (since it can) be accomplished. There can be few
countervailing interests of importance in plaintiff's favor.
The same considerations would apply to cases in the federal
cou:rts184 were it not for the fact that although a district court's
process can reach an owner qua owner just as a state court's can,
that party's presence once obtained may serve to oust the court's
jurisdiction under the complete diversity rule.185 Federal rule
19 (b) permits a court to proceed in absence of an "ought" party
if his joinder would oust the court's jurisdiction; the rule is otherwise if the party is deemed "indispensable." Accordingly, so long
as the present federal categories of parties are used, there is need
for consideration of the distinctions between" them even in property
cases.186
Professor J. W. Moore, referring principally to federal cases,
suggests that two conside3:ations determine what parties must be
before the court in property cases: (I) what type of legal interest in
the property is asserted, and (2) what type of relief is sought.187
Although the latter matter is completely consonant with the thesis
here urged, the former leads again to the employment of barren
concepts which are definable only in terms of themselves. The
hazards of this kind of analysis in property cases and the advantages
of the method of balancing equities and convenience may be suggested by the following examination of some typical problems.
It is a general rule that one tenant in common may maintain
ejectment against a trespasser.188 The tenant is entitled to posses183 There are instances, relatively few, in which the question may still arise. These
involve, chiefly, the timeliness of defendant's objection and the number of those not joined.
l84See 11 Stat. 272 (1858), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1655.
185 And of which more will be said later. See section III-D infra.
186 See, e.g., Fouke v. Schenewerk, (5th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 234.
187 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., 2158 (1948).
188 Most v. Passman, 21 Cal. App." (2d) 729, 70 P. (2d) 271 (1937); Carlson v. McNeill,
114 Colo. 78, 162 P. (2d) 226 (1945); Madrid v. Borrego, 54 N.M. 276, 221 P. (2d) 1058
(1950); Locklear v. Oxendine, 233 N.C. 710, 65 S.E. (2d) 673 (1951); Winborne v. Elizabeth
City Lumber Co., 130 N.C. 32, 40 S.E. 825 (1902). See McComb v. McCormack, (5th Cir.
1947) 159 F. (2d) 219 at 224. Indeed, at one time, joinder was not even permitted. See
Sevenson v. Cofferin, 20 N.H. 150 at 151 (1849), where the court said: "By the common
law there were certain serious embarrassments which would have attended the joinder of
tenants in common in real actions. Although their possession was joint, their estates and
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sion of the whole, except as against a cotenant, and thus he recovers only that to which he is entitled.189 This recovery of possession inures to the benefit of his cotenants.190
On the other hand, joinder of all the tenants is often required
in an action for damages, as in trespass or waste.191 The distinction between this rule and the result in ejectment cases is unsatisfactorily explained by reference ~o property law concepts that although each tenant in common is entitled to possession· of the
whole,102 there is no such unity in monetary damages which may
titles might have been wholly different; and as these were in many cases required to be
stated, and might have been traversed or avoided by plea, it is easy to perceive that
numerous issues might have been joined in a single action, to some of which some of the
parties to the suit might have been strangers, and yet bound to maintain them under
pain of failing in the action. [But query.] This afforded sufficient ground for the rule
which not only permitted but required tenants in common to sever in such actions."
189 Cook v. Spivey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 174 S.W. (2d) 634. For reasons which involve the origin of ejectment, some of the older cases regarded title as the main thing to
be considered and so limited plaintiff's recovery to his interest in the property. See notes,
Extent of recovery in ejectment by tenants in common against stranger, 6 L.R.A. (n.s) 712
(1907), 51 L.R.A. (n.s.) 50 (1914).
190Winborne v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co., 130 N.C. 32, 40 S.E. 825 (1902); Hanley
v. Stewart, 155 Pa. Super. 535, 39 A. (2d) 323 (1944).
·
191 Guth v. Texas Co., (7th Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 563; Holder v. Elmwood Corp., 231
Ala. 411, 165 S. 235 (1936); Bullock v. Hayward, IO Allen (92 Mass.) 460 (1865); De Puy
v. Strong, 37 N.Y. 372 (1867). Cf. Eckerson v. Haverstraw, 6 App. Div. 102, 39 N.Y.S. 635
(1896), affd. 162 N.Y. 652, 57 N.E. 1109 (1900); Slocum v. State, 177 Misc. 114, 29 N.Y.S.
(2d) 993 (1941); Haught v. Continental Oil Co., 192 Okla. 345, 136 P. (2d) 691 (1943);
Marys v. Anderson, 24 Pa. St. 272 (1855). See Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Hart, 119 Ind.
273 at 283, 21 N.E. 753 (1889); and see 14 All[. JuR., Cotenancy §98. This rule, based on
a purpose to avoid multiplicity of suits for damages, is by no means universal. A few
courts permit one tenant not only to recover possession for all but also to collect damages
representing the entire injury to the common property, impressing the fund with a trust
to the extent of the interests of the other tenants. Fleming v. Katahdin Pulp & Paper Co.,
93 Me. 110, 44 A. 378 (1899); Lee v. Follensby, 86 Vt. 401, 85 A. 915 (1913). Cf. Young v.
Garrett, (8th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 223; Carlson v. McNeill, 114 Colo. 78, 162 P. (2d)
226 (1945); Frederick v. Great Nor.them Ry., 207 Wis. 234, 240 N.W. 387 (1932) (joint
tenants). Still other courts have not required joinder but have denied to the plaintiff any
recovery beyond his own damage, leaving defendant open to additional suits by the other
co-owners. Jefferson Lumber Co. v. Berry, 247 Ala. 164, 23 S. (2d) 7 (1945); Kitchens v.
Jefferson County, 85 Ga. App. 902, .70 S.E. (2d) 527 (1952); Winborne v. Elizabeth City
Lumber Co., 130 N.C. 32, 40 S.E. 825 (1902); Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 135 W.Va. 594,
64 S.E. (2d) 606 (1951). Sometimes a cotenant is permitted to recover his own share even
though had defendant objected at the proper time to the absence of plaintiff's fellow tenants joinder might have been required. See, e.g., Eastin v. Joyce, 85 Mo. App. 433 (1900);
Winters v. McGhee, 3 Sneed (35 Tenn.) 128 (1855); Power v. Breckenridge, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927) 290 S.W. 872. In fact, this last is probably what is meant when, in these cases,
a court says joinder is "required": The cotenant is not indispensable, but merely required
if timely objection is made and, in federal courts, if jurisdiction will not be ousted.
Slocum v. State, 177 Misc. 114, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 993 (1941); Young v. Garrett, (8th Cir.
1945) 149 F. (2d) 223. Cf. MacFarland v. State, 177 Misc. 117, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 996 (1941)
(joint tenants); Baughman v. Hower, 56 Ohio App. 162, 10 N.E. (2d) 176 (1937). See
note, 24 TEX. L. REv. 511 (1946).
102 Thompson v. Mawhinney & Smith, 17 Ala. 362 (1850); Metcalfe v. Miller, 96 Mich.
459, 56 N.W. 16 (1893); Taylor v. Millard, 118 N.Y. 244, 23 N.E. 376 (1890). This same
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be recovered. Thus in an ejectment case the defendant (assuming him not to be a cotenant) may not be heard to urge that
plaintiff alone is not entitled to that which he seeks, simply because as a matter of substantive law plaintiff is entitled to possession of the whole as against the trespasser. Not so, in most jurisdictions, as to the suit for damages.
Is there, as to these problems, an essential difference between a
recovery of possession and a recovery of damages? A unity of possession supports ejectment by one cotenant alone. Injury to that
possessory right gives rise to damages which would appear to be
susceptible to the same unity-at least, so far as is necessary to
determine the right of one cotenant to recover them in full from
a trespasser. These damages he will have to share with his fellow
tenant, of course; but so must he share possession with him.
Two considerations only may be thought to support the usual
distinction. First, it may be suggested that to permit one cotenant
to receive all the money damages is unwise because of the possibility that he will be financially unable, or unavailable, to respond
to his cotenant's demand for a portion of the proceeds. If the
facts in- the individual case indicate this possibility, then it should
be weighed by the court; but it is scarce adequate reason for a rule
denying all suits for damages by a single tenant. Further, plaintiff's interest in the real property will often constitute satisfactory
security for the absent tenant's share of the damages.
Second, as a matter of substantive law, the interests of tenants
in common are largely separate. Their only unity is that of possession.193 To give one tenant the power to litigate a controversy
relating to his cotenant's interest may be to place more power in
him than is intended or is wise.194
This is not to argue that more and more cotenants sue alone,
for damages as well as for possession. Because it is well to adjudicate all phases of a controversy in one law suit, to bind all persons interested, and to avoid repeated harassment of defendant, a
joinder of all cotenants wherever feasible is to be urged. And it is
a major theme of this passage that in real property cases .in state
unity, plus those of interest, title, and time, characterize joint tenancies. Wilkins v.
Young, 144 Ind. 1, 41 N.E. 68 (1895). See Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Weightman,
61 Okla. 106 at 109, 160 P. 629 (1916).

193 People ex rel. Shaklee v. Milan, 89 Colo. 556, 5 P. (2d) 249 (1931); Madison v.
Larmon, 170 Ill. 65, 48 N.E. 556 (1897).
194 See Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Southern Lumber Co., 145 Tex. 151, 196 S.W. (2d) 387
(1946).
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courts such joinder is always possible and usually feasible. But if
joinder is not effected and nonjoinder becomes an issue, the decision should not hinge upon a supposed difference between possessory and damage actions, else there are likely to be either "unjust" determinations or laborious attempts by the courts to avoid
the effects of a rigid, pseudo-distinction.
A case in point is Holder v. Elmwood Corporation,19 5 wherein
a mother and her children owned a cemetery lot as tenants in
common. Defendant was responsible for the burial of a stranger196
in the lot, and plaintiff-one of the daughters-brought an action
in trespass to realty. On the issue of whether joinder of the other
tenants in common was required, the court held that although the
general rule is that in trespass to realty all tenants in common must
join, the rule has its exceptions. One such exception, here applicable, is that where the action is directed toward the recovery of
consequential damages (such as damages for mental suffering
resulting from a trespass committed under circumstances of insult
or contumely),1 97 a tenant thus injured may sue alone.198 A concurring judge, sensing the issue a trifle better, suggested that in
reality the Holder case is a situation in which trespass on the case
would lie, and that no joinder would be required there. But unfortunately he maintained that if this were really an action in
trespass to realty, there would be no authority for proceeding without the other cotenants.
The result reached by the court seems wise. It is a case in
which, although formally for trespass to realty, the principal issue
relates not to the usual trespass questions of where title is or
whether there has in fact been a trespass (which apparently is conceded). Instead the controversy centers about the amount of
damage personal to plaintiff. If an award for injury to plaintiff's
feelings is to be made, there is little reason to require the presence
of her brothers and her sisters and her cousins and her aunts.
When separate plaintiffs have no factual issue of substance in common there can be little support for compulsory joinder of those
plaintiffs. The instant case is one in which the wisdom of even
1011 231 Ala. 411, 165 S. 235 (1936).
100 Cf. KEssELRING, ARsENIC AND OLD

LACE, Act II, where Abby Brewster says: "That
man's an imposter! And if he came here to be buried in our cellar he's mistaken .•••
We've always wanted to hold a double funeral, but I will not read services over a total
stranger."
187 That such damages may be recovered in an action in Alabama for the trespass to
realty, see Mattingly v. Houston, 167 Ala. 167, 52 S. 78 (1909).
198 Cf. Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N.Y. 249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917).
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permissible joinder is not self-evident; a fortiori, there should be
no compulsion to join.
Both opinions give implied recognition to these factors. But
to reach this appropriate-result the -mafo:rTI.y opinion deals in exceptions to the joinder rule- in trespass to realty cases, while the
concurring judge, unwilling to see the integrity of the trespass
rule impaired, reasons that this is essentially an action in case,
where joinder is not required. This kind of manipulation of
labels to rationalize conclusions supportable upon far more reasonable and practical grounds is not designed to evoke much confidence in the method. This situation differs from that in the
ordinary case of trespass to realty, where the issues are the fact of
the trespass and the amount of the damage to the realty. In such
case there is every reason to require the whole matter to be
litigated in one suit-whether by joining all co-owners or by permitting one owner to maintain a representative action. _The
issues are the same as to all mrners, with the unimportant exception of possible- quantitative differences in their interests in the
land. In Holder, however, there is scarcely a single advantage in
compelling joinder, and had the court based its decision on a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages, the conveniences
and inconveniences, the equities and iriequities of the alternative
possibilities, there would have been no need for the irrelevant and
merely confusing discussion of whether this was trespass or case
or some· exception to one of them.
How should these problems be handled? Two Texas decisions
provide good illustrations of how non-conceptual, practical considerations may be brought to bear in reaching sensible results in
these cases. In one,199 the plaintiff, suing in trespass to try title,
had assigned a portion of the claim to her attorney, one Tucker,
but he did not join with her as party plaintiff. Joinder obviously
was possible, and the court required it, stating that under Texas
law Tucker was a necessary (but not an indispensable) party.
After holding that he must become a party under the rule that
persons having "joint interests" must be brought in if subject to
the court's jurisdiction,2°0 the court said:
"There is another reason why Tucker was a necessary
party in order to enable the court to grant complete relief as
between the parties already before the Court. About the
199 Brown v. Meyers, (Tex. Civ. App.
200 To the extent that this principle

1942) 163 S.W. (2d) 886.
is the controlling consideration in the court's
determination, the opinion leaves much to be desired.
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only relief, ·generally speaking, that a defendant has by law
against a plaintiff for asserting a claim against him which is
found upon trial to be ill-founded, is the right to recover the
court costs thereby incurred .. Such right ... is the complete
relief the law allows a defendant against a plaintiff for the
annoyance and expense of defending against the plaintiff's
claim. Since Tucker was a joint owner with plaintiff of the
claim she was asserting against defendants, such defendants
were entitled to have him made a plaintiff of record so that, in
case defendants prevailed, they could have judgment against
him for the costs they were put to in defending against the
claim. " 201
In its logical extreme this would require the joinder as plaintiff
of every party who stood to benefit from the judgment sought,
simply to stand as security for costs in the event that defendant
prevailed, and it is doubtful that many courts would go so far.
The case serves, however, to illustrate the manner in which relatively minor factors can be thrown onto the balance to see whether
in a given situation a court should proceed in the absence of interested persons. The particular inquiry is sensible in cases
like the instant one to help decide whether joinder, clearly possible, ought to be required. If joinder is impossible and absence
unavoidable, then surely no court would refuse to go ahead simply
because defendant could not hold the absent party liable for
costs in the event that plaintiff's claim proves ill-founded.202
The second case, Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement & Development Corporation,203 is a yet more forceful illustration of the
advantages of a flexible, practical approach to the joinder problem. Therein, 104 tenants in common, as heirs of Tom Collier,
brought an action of trespass to try title - the Texas equivalent
of ejectment204 - and for damages, including damages for withdrawal and appropriation of oil and gas. Defendants alleged the
existence of 574205 other heirs of Tom Collier, and pleaded their
nonjoinder in abatement. The trial court sustained the plea in
abatement and, on plaintiffs' refusal to amend, dismissed the suit.
201163 S.W. (2d) 886 at 889.
202 Indeed, as suggested in the text above, the Texas court held that the attorney
"was not a necessary party in order for a valid judgment to have been entered." Ibid.
203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 188 S.W. (2d) 915.
204 Cage Bros. v. Whiteman, 139 Tex. 522, 163 S.W. (2d) 638 (1942).
205 Although the figure 574 is used generally in the opinion, at two places the court
refers to the 512 heirs listed in the first amended plea and the 63 additional heirs in the
second amended plea. 188 S.W. (2d) 886 at 927, 928.
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Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court reversed, holding that
these l 04 plaintiffs might proceed alone.
The court noted the well settled rule that trespass to try title
(ejectment) can be brought by one tenant in common against
one having no title. Thus, there was no serious question on this
phase of the case.
The real controversy related to the prayer for damages. On
this point, the court stated that the rule is equally well settled
that a defendant in a damage action for injury to property has
a right to require that all tenants in common be made parties
to the suit. He must file his objection in limine,206 but defendants did that here. The purpose of the joinder requirement, the
court observed, is to avoid multiplicity of suits against defendant.207 The court stated that· since in a suit for damages all tenants in common should join, the rule is not different simply
because damages are sought as incident208 to a possessory action,
in which joinder of the others is not required.
Nevertheless, as mentioned, the 104 were permitted to proceed in the absence of the other 574. To reach this result, the
court found it desirable first to characterize briefly the nature of
the interests of plaintiffs and the absent tenants:
" ... [I]t is apparent that the rights of the various tenants
in common to recover damages for injury to the property
owned in common are technically several as distinguished
from joint; that each tenant in common is only entitled to the
possession of his own share of the damages; that the presence
of all tenants in common is not indispensable to the rendition
of judgment for damages in favor of one or less than all; and
that the determination of the plaintiff's proportionate share of
the damages and the adjudgment thereof to him despite the
absence of his tenant in common constitutes relief which can
be granted, and which, in fact, seems to have been regarded by
our courts as if it were as normal and customary a form of
relief as the very right of a defendant to insist upon
joinder."209
However, after this concession to tradition, the court turned
to a painstaking examination of the circumstances of this litiga206 Else his only protection is his right to require apportionment of damages, so that
plaintiff recovers only his share. See note 191 supra; 188 S.W. (2d) 915 at 920.
207 May v. Slade, 24 Tex. 205 (1859). Cf. Taylor v. Catalon, 140 Tex. 38, 166 S.W.
(2d) 102 (1942).
,
208 Plaintiffs sought relief in excess of three quarters of a million dollars-a rather
substantial "incident."
209 188 S.W. (2d) 915 at 921.
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tion to see whether the factors supporting plaintiffs' claim to go
it alone outweighed defendants' claim to have their liabilities
settled in one lawsuit. And it found no lack of authority for its
power so to inquire. From Story's Equity Pleadings, for example,
this quotation:
"All diese exceptions [to rules requiring joinder of persons materially interested in subject matter] will be found to
be governed by one and the same principle, which is, that, as
the object of the general rule is to accomplish the purposes of
justice between all the parties in interest, and it is a rule
founded, in some sort, upon public convenience and policy,
rather than upon positive principles of municipal or general
jurisprudence, courts of equity will not suffer it to be so applied as to defeat the very purposes of justice, if they can dispose of the merits of the case before them without prejudice
to the rights or interests of other persons, who are not parties,
or if the circumstances of the case render the application of
the rule wholly impracticable."210
One of the exceptions referred to by Story is for parties so numerous that it is impracticable to join them. Although the statement is normally made in the context of class actions, "we believe
the rule can be applied, and ought to be applied, as an independent exception where no effective relief can be granted in a class
suit to persons who are not before the court in the ordinary and
usual sense as named parties."211
Then the court examined with some care the facts relating
to the tenants in common mentioned in the plea in abatement.
"The petition names I 04 plaintiffs, of whom perhaps 17
are formal parties. Plaintiffs include residents of fifteen
counties in Texas and two parishes in Louisiana; two come
from Michigan, and one from Puerto Rico. The pleas in
abatement now list 574 additional heirs of Tom Collier and
tenants in common of appellants who are described as necessary parties to this suit. It is with more than casual interest
that we have searched for some evidence or some statement
to the effect that these were all of such heirs, but we have not
found such evidence or such a statement in the record. It
seems of direct significance to the application of the exceptions noted [relating to nonjoinder of interested parties) that
77 (10th ed., 1892).
211188 S.W. (2d) 915 at 927; Hess v. Webb, 103 Tex. 46,. 123 S.W. 111 (1909). Cf.
Bailey v. Morgan, 13 Tex. 342 (1855): Smith v. Peeler, (Tex. Com. App. 1930) 29 S.W.
(2d) 975.
210 Section
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appellees amended their pleas in abatement twice; that their
first amended pleas in abatement listed 512 such heirs and
that 63 additional heirs212 were named in the second amended
pleas, on which the trial court acted. It now appears that five
persons who were named in said first amended pleas are dead;
that three persons named in said pleas are now described as
married women, and that mistakes in the names of several
individuals have been discovered and corrected.
[A]mong the 63 additional heirs are residents of four additional states, namely, of two counties in New Mexico, one
county in Arizona, two counties in Georgia, and one county
in Florida. These 63 persons also include residents of three
additional parishes in Louisiana and nine additional counties in Texas. Among these 63, one unknown person, a formal party, is referred to; no addresses are given for two persons; and eight minors are listed, without reference to guardianship. Although we have no information respecting the
status and residence of the 512 heirs listed in the first amended
plea, we feel safe in assuming that they are as diversely scattered about the United States and are of as varied a status as
are the 63 additional persons named in the second amended
pleas. "213
After this recital, the court simply held that the action might
proceed without joining the absent tenants in common, on the
grounds that every issue raised by the pleadings could be determined between the parties in the absence of the omitted tenants.
and without injury to their interests, and that
"The injury which may result to [defendants] from a
multiplicity of suits on the causes of action before us is more
than counterbalanced by the injury which might result to
appellants if the exception noted was not applied, for otherwise [plaintiffs] . . . might be denied the right to maintain
their action. . . . [U]pon considering the great number of
plaintiffs already in this suit, and the diverse status and residences of said plaintiffs, we have reached the conclusion that
it would be impracticable . . . to require the joinder of any
appreciable number or percentage of the persons listed in
the pleas in abatement. . .. " 214
Here exemplified is the very approach suggested throughout these
materials. This is the way to do it! Recognition is given to the
212 See note 205 supra.
213188 S.W. (2d) 915 at 927-928.
214 Id. at 928, 930.
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pressing need to conclude the controversy as neatly and expeditiously as possible. Defendants must be protected from repetitive
litigation, if possible. But the countervailing factor is the tremendous difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining the presence
of all interested - numbering in the hundreds. The court's opinion, which is long, contains some discussion of the nature of the
rights involved. The court does conclude that the rights of the
tenants in common, although technically several,215 are joint
within the meaning of the rule 216 that persons having a joint
interest shall be made parties,217 and that all else being equal
there is much force in defendants' position that the suit should be
abated unless all are joined. But all else is not equal; indeed,
the force of the difficulty argument outweighs, and plaintiffs are
permitted to proceed without their fellow tenants. 218
One may dissent from the court's conclusion on the ground
that substituted service would suffice to confer jurisdiction to
settle the whole controversy. But the important thing to note is
the court's method. One knows exactly what considerations produced the decision. There is no camouflage, no hiding behind
slippery, conceptual terms meaning one thing this time and another the next. The court states the practical factors which moved
it to this result. This is the method which ought always to be
employed.
What of determinations of the respective interests of co-owners
among themselves, as in partition, for example? The purpose of
judicial partition is to determine the interests of the co-owners
and to sever and divide the property among them. 210 No clairvoyance is needed to sense that courts seldom, if ever, will dispense
with a co-owner in a partition suit. If tenant in common A is
absent from a partition suit, any determination of the interests
of the other co-owners will be imperfect. It will not be binding
on A.220 Title to the property will be difficult to market. If a co2111 See text at note 209 supra.
210 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 39 (a) (similar to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
19[a]).
217188 S.W. (2d) 915 at 926.
218 Cf. Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations v. Seitz, (10th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 456, an
action to establish title and recover possession, where the court proceeded without the
United States (which refused to be joined and would not, therefore, be bound) even
though this left defendants with cloud on their title and subject to another suit. The
court held that the uncertainty of defendants' position was nothing new and was outweighed by the inability of plaintiff nations to obtain any adjudication otherwise.
219 See 40 AM. JUR., Partition §§2, 4, 27.
220 If support is needed for this near-axiomatic statement, see Butler v. Roys, 25 Mich.
53 (1872).
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owner nevertheless succeeds in selling an imperfectly partitioned
share, he and his buyer may have some renegotiating to do -when
A appears, attacks the partition, and gets it set aside.221 The presence of all parties in interest in the partition action is clearly
indicated, and this is the standard pronouncement on the question: All persons having or claiming any interest in the land
in suit are necessary parties.222 As suggested earlier, it never will
be impossible for a state court to obtain jurisdiction over all coowners, known and unknown, domestic and foreign; the presence of the land in the jurisdiction furnishes a basis for constructive service of process, and with no relief sought other than determination and severance of respective interests in the land {and,
possibly, distribution of the proc~eds of a judicial sale) the court
clearly has the requisite power over all owners to enter a decree.223
Therefore, joinder will be required.
The rule in the federal courts is much the same,224 except when
joinder of all co-owners would destroy complete diversity of citizenship and, typically, the foundation of jurisdiction. If co-owners
are merely necessary, jurisdiction-destroying joinder may be dispensed with; if indispensable, then the federal court should not
proceed.2211 Which is the case?
Although it seems amiss, as argued repeatedly herein, to conclude that a federal court is without power to issue a partial decree among those owners present {having dispensed with joinder
of diversity-destroying owners), the practical value of the decree
and the effects of the court's action normally would be so slight
that expenditure of the court's effort in this direction would be
unwarranted. This complies, substantially, with one of the tests
of indispensability in Shields v. Barrow: the controversy would
be left "in such a condition that its final determination may be
221lbid.
Henry Quellmalz Lumber &: Mfg. Co. v. Roche, 145 Ark. 38, 223 S.W. 376 (1920);
Gates v. Salmon, 35 Cal. 576 (1868); Butler v. Roys, 25 Mich. 53 (1872); Wilson v. Wilson,
166 Miss. 369, 146 S. 855 (1933); Johnson v. Johnson, 170 Mo. 34, 70 S.W. 241 (1902);
Toole v. Toole, 112 N.Y. 333, 19 N.E. 682 (1889). Cf. Camp Phosphate Co. v. Anderson,
48 Fla. 226, 37 S. 722 (1904); Haggerty v. Wagner, 148 Ind. 625, 48 N.E. 366 (1897); Young
v. Meyers, 124 Ohio St. 448, 179 N.E. 358 (1931). But cf. Bank of California v. Superior
Court, 16 Cal. (2d) 516, 106 P. (2d) 879 (1940).
223 Toole v. Toole, 112 N.Y. 333, 19 N.E. 682 (1889). See Fouke v. Schenewerk, (5th
Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 234 at 236; Arizona Lead Mines v. Sullivan Mining Co., (D.C. Idaho
1943) 3 F.R.D. 135 at 138.
224 Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 280 (1867); Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U.S. 527
(1892). Sec. 1655 of Tit. 28 of the United States Code (1952) continues the venerable
provision for substituted service in actions to enforce a claim to property within the district. That this applies to partition actions, see Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U.S. 58 (1894).
225 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 (a), (b).
222
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wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience." 226 A would
not be bound, and the interests of those made parties still would
be subject to A's claims. Title would be highly unmarketable.
The whole situation would be tentative and uncertain, to say the
least. In the absence of the most compelling of countervailing
considerations, the court should refuse to proceed. Is any such
consideration possible here?
One can conceive of but two circumstances which might be
forwarded as sufficiently important to overcome the court's reluctance to proceed. The first, unavailability of another forum, may
be disposed of easily. Plaintiff clearly has a remedy in the state
court, and the federal court should take cognizance of that plain
fact. 227 Diversity jurisdiction "is a luxury here, not a necessity.
The second, closely related, involves the suggestion that because of local prejudice a fair trial cannot be had in the state
forum. In other words, although there is another court where
plaintiff may have his claim adjudicated, the alternative to remaining in federal court is heavily weighted against plaintiff. To
the extent that venue change within the state is available and
efficacious, the suggestion has no merit in this context. If, however, diversity jurisdiction is demonstrably needed to accomplish
here what apparently was its original purpose - to provide a
neutral forum for citizens of different states - then conceivably
the federal court might consent to proceed without A. But this
is rather academic, because it is hard to imagine a partition case
in which incomplete relief in a federal court would be superior
to the complete relief available in a state court. In other terms,
the practical objections to partitioning land among less than all
co-owners are so strong that it is almost inconceivable that there
could exist countervailing prejudices sufficient to cause a federal
court to proceed nevertheless.
Thus it seems valid to characterize co-owners as indispensable
parties to judicial partitions, not conceptually but factually.
22617 How. (58 U.S.) 130 at 139 (1854). At least, Justice Miller so indicated in the
majority opinion in Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 280 at 285 (1867): "This language aptly describes the character of the interest of the Ridgelys, in the land of which
partition is sought in this suit. ••. If, for instance, the decree should partition the land
and state an account, the particular pieces of land allotted to the parties before the court,
would still be undivided as to these parties, whose interest in each piece would remain
as before the partition. And they could at any time apply to the proper court, and ask
a repartition· of the whole tract, unaffected by the decree in this case, because they can
be bound by no decree to which they are not parties."
227 Fouke v. Schenewerk, (5th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 234.
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Although the existence of undivided joint interests in land
presents the best argument for required joinder of the owners
in actions having to do with that land, there are other types of
(common) interest which give rise to joinder questions. One of
these arises out of the lessor-lessee relationship, not in terms of
litigation inter sese but in suits by or against one without the
other. When should a lessee be joined in an action by or against
his lessor? When should a lessor be joined in his lessee's action?
To remain for the moment on the subject of partition, it is
interesting to note the holdings on the necessity of joining lessees
of co-owners. Some courts - apparently most - hold that since
the interest of a lessee will not be affected by the partition, the
existence of the lease is no bar to partition among reversioners or
remaindermen228 and the lessee is not a necessary party to the
action. 229 A few courts, however, hold the lessee necessary,230 while
still others indicate - largely on statutory grounds - that the lease
is a bar to the maintenance of the action. 231
If in fact a lessee's interest will not be affected by partition,
the conclusion that he need not be joined can scarce be gainsaid.
Upon what ground, then, is a lessee ever held necessary? In a
dictum in Thruston v. Minke,232 the Maryland court said that the
lessee should be joined so that he "may be required to join the
lessor in the deed of severance."233 Surely this is but a formality.
Failure to join could not qualify the partition. The fee is subject
to an outstanding lease. This lease cannot be diminished by the
partition, absent special circumstances; neither does the lease
render the severance of the various reversionary or remainder
interests the less effective.
228 Willard v. Willard, 145 U.S. 116 (1892); Finch v. Smith, 146 Ala. 644, 41 S. 819'
(1906); Blakeslee v. Blakeslee, 265 Ill. 48, 106 N.E. 470 (1914). Cf. Erwin v. Hines, 190
Okla. 99, 121 P. (2d) 612 (1942).
229 Fyffe v. Fyffe, 292 Ill. App. 539, 11 N .E. (2d) 857 (1937): Bethel College v. Gladdish, 204 Ky. 10, 263 S.W. 659 (1924); Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 571 (1870); Peterman v.
Kingsley, 140 Wis. 666, 123 N.W. 137 (1909). Cf. Gailey v. Ricketts, 123 Ark. 18, 184 S.W.
422 (1916).
230 Glaser v. Burns, 154 N.Y.S. 21 (1915), affd. 170 App. Div. 321, 155 N.Y.S. 936 (1915);
Comish v. Gest, 2 Cox Eq. Cas. 27, 30 Eng. Rep. 13 (1821). See Thruston v. Minke, 32
Md. 571 at 575 (1870).
231 Hunnewell v. Taylor, 6 Cush. (60 Mass.) 472 (1850); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 66 N.Y.
37 (1876) (partition now might be unfair by the end of the lease). See Henderson v.
Henderson, 136 Iowa 564 at 568, 114 N.W. 178 (1907). The statutes provide that partition
is available only to owners of estates in possession.
232 32 Md. 571 (1870).
233 Id. at 575. The court held this consideration inapplicable in the instant case for
the reason, inter alia, that there was not to be a severance but rather a judicial sale with
distribution of the proceeds.
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In an English equity case, the court noted that the tenant therein had an interest approximating a freehold, "a very material interest which must [sic] be affected by this decree." 234 · In fact, the
tenant had a 99-year lease determinable on lives - a once common way of establishing a life tenancy without some of its technical disadvantages. Although conceivably it may be sensible to
include as a party one who will have the possessory interest for a
potentially long term, the brief opinion does not suggest how the
interest must be affected by the sought partition, and it thus is
difficult to support the conclusion that the lessee is necessary.
Incidentally, one American court distinguishes between a tenant
for a long term (necessary) and a tenant from year to year (not
even properl).2311
In general, the necessity of joining a tenant in partition cases
is determined on the usual test of whether his interest will be
affected by the partition. Normally it will not. A few courts say
it will and hold the tenant necessary; none holds him "indispensable."
A sampling of injunction cases with respect to activity on leased
land supports further the conclusion that the important test is
whether the action by or against a lessor only, or a lessee only,
so affects the interest of the other that any litigation ought to be
undertaken or defended by them together. Thus the Iowa Supreme Court held236 that in an action against an oil company to
have operation of the company's filling station abated as a nuisance, the lessee-operator was an "indispensable" party under the
rule that
"A party is indispensable if his interest is not severable,
and his absence will prevent the Court from rendering any
judgment between the parties before it; or if nothwithstanding his absence his interest would necessarily be inequitably
affected by a judgment rendered between those before the
court. " 237
The operator was a lessee and not an employee, and it would
seem evident that any injunction granted by the court ought to
run against him also and not merely the lessor, particularly if it
prescribes conditions relating to the mode of operation.238 Be234 Cornish v. Gest, 2 Cox Eq. Cas. 27, 30 Eng. Rep. 13 (1821).
285 Thruston v. Minke again. See notes 229 ff.
286 Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 234 Iowa 1241, 15 N.W. (2d) 275

(1944).

237 Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 25 (b).
288 Cf. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Blue Diamond Products Co., (8th Cir.
1951) 192 F. (2d) 43.
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cause an injunction would render his lease of less (perhaps no)
value, he should have opportunity to be heard in opposition. It
is probable that he was within the jurisdiction and subject to the
court's process. There was strong reason to require his joinder
and apparently none to excuse it. No fault can be found with
the result.
Unfortunate, however, are the Iowa rule and the court's use
of it in characterizing the lessee as indispensable. As to the rule's
first clause, severability of interest very nearly begs the question
in every case. In the instant case it was of no help; the court did
not suggest that there was a non-severable interest. The inquiry
suggested in the second clause into whether a decree would necessarily affect the absent party inequitably points in the right direction, although taken alone it is yet short of adequate. But,
good or bad, it does not clearly apply to this case. The rule labels
as indispensable a party who would "necessarily be inequitably
affected." _A determination (<;:learly possible) that operation of
the station did not constitute a nuisance would not affect the lessee
inequitably (adversely); therefore, he is not necessarily so affected.
The mere possibility of an adverse holding may suffice, in context, to require joinder. But alone it does not deprive the court,
either by the rule or on general principle, of power to proceed
without the lessee if there is a legitimate reason why he cannot
be joined. Enjoining the lessor alone might serve to abate the
nuisance. For many purposes, a filling station lessee is little more
than an employee,239 the lease being drafted to give the lessor
company as much employer control as possible without abandoning the lease status; and on occasion the company may be treated
as employer despite the terminology of the agreement. 240 Under
such circumstance, action against the lessor alone might serve as
a satisfactory, better-than-nothing remedy. There is nothing basic
missing from the ability of the court to proceed in that fashion.
To be compared with the filling station case is Ambassador
Petroleum Company v. Superior Court. 241 The state of California
sought under statute to enjoin some forty-two operators (lessees)
in an oil field from committing unreasonable waste of natural
gas. In the cited action the operators made application for a writ
of prohibition to restrain the proceedings until the lessors of the
239 See note, 1 OKLA. L. REv. 277 (1948).
240 See, e.g., Greene v. Spinning, (Mo. App. 1931) 48 S.W. (2d) 51; Eason Oil Co. v.
Runyan, 158 Okla. 241, 13 P. (2d) 118 (1932).
241208 Cal. 667,284 P. 445 (1930).
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land be joined, for the asserted reason that the lessors' royalties
on production would be affected. 242 Although suggesting by way
of dictum that a different rule would apply in purely private disputes, the court held that the lessors were not indispensable even
though they would be "bound" by the ruling.
The court apparently was faced with a situation in which the
· large number and diverse locations of owners of the property
made it difficult to find them or impracticable to bring them all
in. The purpose of the original action was to conserve natural
resources in the public interest, and that could be done most effectively by enjoining certain activities of the defendant operators.
Although the question of illegal operation could be determined
between the state and the operators, the consequence of reducing
royalty payments to owners certainly justified joining the owners,
and would even suggest that their presence be required if feasible. (Indeed, the California court in a later decision243 referred
to the Ambassador Petroleum case as one involving "necessary"
as distinguished from "indispensable" parties - that is, parties
whose joinder would be required if possible, but whose excusable
absence would not prevent an adjudication by the court.)
The court noted the state's argument that "the interests of
both lessors and lessees in defeating the pending action are identical in so far as said action may result in a diminution of production and . . . the petitioners [lessees] are therefore the representatives of their lessors in defending said action," 244 and indicated its agreement, saying: "Certain it is that the interests of
the parties so claimed to be represented and the interests of those
before the court are not antagonistic. The interests of the numerous lessors . . . are so inseparably bound up and identical with
the interests of the lessees in the subject matter of the action that
both might well be deemed in the same class in the pending litigation.2411
Yet for aught that appears in the opinion, the interests of
the absent lessors may lie with the state almost as easily as with the
lessors. The court does not indicate that there has been any factual inquiry into the question of what the lessors - any of them
-·want. It seems simply to assume that because an injunction
242 The degree of defendants' solicitude for the welfare of absent parties, both here
and generally, is remarkably related to its usefulness as a defense in the pending action.
243 Bank of California v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. (2d) 516, 106 P. (2d) 879 (1940).
244 208 Cal. 667 at 675.
2411Ibid.
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will reduce production and, therefore, royalties, the lessors oppose
the injunction as do the lessees. It is possible, however, that inquiry would disclose that high production (and royalties) now
would result in a much shorter well life, with consequent less total
return from the well. An operator's natural desire for quick recovery of his drilling costs, with which to drill again, may lead
in quite the opposite direction from the lessor's desire for the
greatest return from his royalty interest, even if it be spread out
over a longer period of time. The facts related by the court are insufficient to provide a basis for judgment as to which result would
be adverse to any of the lessors. In this respect the opinion appears faulty; one cannot tell whether the court made a proper
determination or not. But the result reached is supportable notwithstanding, because the public interest, as defined by the statute
providing for this kind of action, furnished the court ground for
going ahead in the teeth of the conceded possibility that the absent owners would be, in fact, adversely affected.
The court did not stumble over concepts of inseparability of
rights or over lack of power to determine the legal position of
absent parties. Instead, it appears to have weighed the importance
of protecting the public interest, as expressed in the conservation
law, against the importance of protecting the interests of absent
owners, and to have found that the former overbalanced the latter. Whatever possibility there was of bringing in the absentee
owners by constructive service of process was apparently overcome by the impracticability of citing in so large a number. 246
The court's method here is commendable. Although there was
the possibility that absent persons would be adversely affected
factually - and this usually serves to bar consideration of the case
- that possibility was outweighed by the need for gas conservation. When the court stated that a different result might obtain
in purely private disputes, that simply was recognition that in
the absence of the public interest in conservation there would
246 The court appropriately could have inquired whether any steps had been taken
to notify the owners of the pendency of the action, enabling any of them desiring to do
so to enter the action as a litigant. Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Atlantic City Jewish Community Center, 14 N.J. Misc. 1, 181 A. 700 (1935), affd. 121 N.J. Eq. 110, 187 A. 372 (1936).
Reference to the large number of owners immediately suggests the possibility of a
representative suit, and the court offhandedly mentions that because the interests of the
operators and of the owners are "so inseparably bound up and identical" with each other,
"No violence would therefore be done to the doctrine of representation to hold that in
defending said action the petitioners are representing their lessors." 208 Cal. 667 at 675.
With the language in context, however, the court seems not to hold that there was virtual
representation of the owners; rather, it holds that the injunction action may proceed without the owners.
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be no compelling reason for proceeding without the owners. It
is not to say that the court's power is diminished or its discretion shackled.
Lawsuits directed toward invalidating a deed or lease are
usually but not universally247 subjected to the requirement that
there be joined not only all parties to the instrument248 (a common
holding in contract rescission cases249 ) but also all persons whose
interests in the land may be adversely affected by the litigation.250
Failure to join all parties to a lease and to a deed in an action
to cancel and to rescind was held "fundamental error," which can
be raised in the appellate court for the first time, even without
assignment of error.251 The court spoke in the same case of the
party defect as depriving it of "authority" to pass on the merits
of the controversy or to decide any question which might affect
the rights of the absent parties. Lessors who are tenants in common
all must be before the court in a suit in which they seek to cancel
a lease.252 But a Kansas case indicated that if tenants in common
convey by separate instruments, joinder not only may not be required, it may not even be permitted-this in the face of the fact
that all conveyances run to a single person in consequence of a
single fraudulent scheme. 253 Fortunately, liberalized rules and
interpretations would permit such joinder in nearly all jurisdic247 As exceptions to the general rule, see, e.g., Gandy v. Fortner, 119 Ala. 303, 24 S.
425 (1898); Corwin v. Tillman, 255 Ill. App. 230 (1929); Stevens v. Thompson, 98 Mich.
9, 56 N.W. 1041 (1893).
248 Eaten v. Nona-Fletcher Mineral Co., (5th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 629; Lake v. Dowd,
207 Cal. 290, 277 P. 1047 (1929); Henson v. Federal Land Bank, 162 Ga. 839, 134 S.E. 923
(1926); Brinker v. Haydon, 3 Dana (33 Ky.) 156 (1835); Dose v. Dose, 172 Minn. 145, 214
N.W. 769 (1927).
249 Trimble v. John C. Winston Co., (5th Cir. 1932) 56 F. (2d) 150, cert. den. 286 U.S.
555 (1932); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Smith, (9th Cir. 1921) 273 F. 1, affd .. 266 U.S. 152
(1924); Spanner v. Brandt, (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 1 F.R.D. 555. Cf. Board of Railroad Commrs.
v. Reed, 102 Mont. 382, 58 P. (2d) 271 (1936). See 3 BLACK, REscISSION AND CANCELLATION,
2d ed., §657 (1929). But d. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brandenburg, (S.D. N.Y.
1948) 8 F.R.D. 151.
•
250 Calcote v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., (5th Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 216, cert. den.
329 U.S. 782 (1946); Mitau v. Roddan, 149 Cal. 1, 84 P. 145 (1906); Young v. Young, 157
Wis. 424, 147 N.W. 361 (1914). Cf. Warfield v. Marks, (5th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 178;
Sigal v. Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 A. 742 (1935).
251 Dial v. Martin, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 8 S.W. (2d) 241; a subsequent reversal, on
other grounds, is not pertinent here.
252 Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v. Duggins, (6th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 1011. The
court distinguished the case from suits in ejectment, in which tenants in common need
not join. " .•. a tenant in common in such an action is seeking to recover his aliquot
portion of the land involved, and each tenant in common has a similar separate right.
The rule does not apply when tenants in common seek to cancel or rescind a lease of oil
and gas. In such an action it is the rule that all the tenants in common must unite on
account of the contract involved being an entire and indivisible one." P. 1016. The problem is deemed to possess more contract characteristics than property peculiarities.
263 Jeffers v. Forbes, 28 Kan. 174 (1882).
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tions today; but there is little reason to believe that the issue of
compulsory joinder would be decided differently.
In Cunningham v. Brewer,254 the Nebraska court held that
both Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham were "indispensable" parties to
a suit to rescind for fraud a deed of their homestead to Brewer.
Under state law they were joint tenants with right of survivorship,
and the court stated that a final decree canceling the deed could
not be entered without materially affecting both of them. Although
the statement is true literally, it would be quite possible for the
appellate court to reach a result (as did the trial court) which would
not adversely affect the absent husband: a judgment for plaintiffwife. As an Illinois court said in a similar case, "The decree on the
prayer asked for took nothing from [him], but, on the contrary,
the cancellation of the deed thereunder would restore whatever
rights [he] had lost."255 Were the issue being raised for the first
time in the trial court, the perhaps equal possibility of a judgment
for defendant would indeed justify a court in refusing to proceed
until Mr. Cunningham was brought in, else the whole proceeding
might ultimately prove to have been in vain. Mr. Cunningham
apparently was available; indeed the ,trial court had denied as untimely his motion to intervene after trial. But the fact is that the
issue of his nonjoinder was being raised for the first time in the
appellate court. The result was to remand the case to the trial
court with direction to make him a party. For all that appears,
when the trial court and the appellate court look at the case next
time they may order rescission, thus having rendered of no particular importance the husband's absence in the first case. Already
having the record before it, it seems wasteful for the appellate
court to remand the case without first determining-probably with
some ease....:whether it would be inclined to rule in favor of defendant. If it would be so disposed, then it ought to remand, so that
Mr. Cunningham could be heard.256 If, however, a judgment for
plaintiff (Mrs. Cunningham) appeared warranted, the presence
of the husband would add nothing; on balance, the judgment
254144 Neb. 2II, 16 N.W. (2d) 533 (1944).
255 Corwin v. Tillman, 255 Ill. App. 230 at 235 (1929).
256 This assumes that Mr. Cunningham's interest is aligned with his wife's and will be
served as hers is served. Actually, it appears that Mr. Brewer, knowing of Mrs. Cunningham's "physical and mental weakness," paid Mr. Cunningham, illiterate and a habitual
drunkard, $150 to persuade his wife to join him in the deed to Brewer. Presumably Mr.
Cunningham is not now a friend of Mr. Brewer's, but his true position in the controversy is not made clear. As mentioned in the text above, Mr. Cunningham attempted to
intervene after trial, but his petition was denied for reasons not stated.
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would affect him beneficially-not adversely-and no second suit
would ensue.
In Sigal v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Company 251 the
Connecticut court proceeded to an affirmance of a trial court ruling
that an agreement was valid, even though there were absent several
individuals having a "direct interest" whose "rights would be
adversely affected" if the agreement w~re held invalid. Said the
court:
"But the question at issue has been ably and thoroughly
presented to us; in our opinion the agreement is clearly valid;
a decision to this effect will give the persons who are mentioned in it all they could claim; and any right of the estate
would depend upon facts not appearing upon the present
record and which may or may not exist. We shall therefore
decide the case, even though, of course, our decision would
not be conclusive upon the rights of persons not parties to
the action.''258
Put it this way: A valid reason for a trial court's refusal to
proceed when one possible outcome of a case will affect an absent
party adversely is that so long as that potentiality exists, there is a
strong possibility that the court and the parties will have had their
time employed in a completely vain pursuit, which must be gone
through again in the presence of a party absent the first time. If
the absent one is available he ought by all means to be brought in.
That makes sense. But Cunningham v. Brewer stands at the other
end of the trail. The case has already been tried and the result
in the trial court was a victory fe>r Mrs. Cunningham: rescission.
Since Mr. Cunningham's interest presumably is aligned with that
of his wife's, he is not yet harmed. When the appellate court,
without looking at the merits, sends the case back for a new trial
with the husband present, it does not assure that there will be no
waste of judicial energy.259 Instead, it seems to produce the prospect of even more potentially vain effort than has already been
expended....:...that is, in the event of a victory for plaintiffs in a subsequent trial and appeal. How much better it would be for the
Nebraska court to follow the example of the Sigal case: 260 to
examine the record and, if it finds support for the decree below
and no adverse effect upon the husband, to affirm; plaintiff's case
presumably would become no weaker upon the addition of her
257119 Conn. 570, 177 A. 742 (1935).
258 Id. at 573.
259 Except as this case may be a warning to subsequent litigants.
260 Note 257 supra.
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husband. If, on the other hand, a reversal on the merits is warranted, a new trial is in order, because judgment for defendant
might accomplish little by way of a complete disposition of the
controversy: Mr. Cunningham may well bring a suit of his own,
thus putting defendant improperly to the trouble of resisting two
suits and imposing unnecessarily on the courts..
Two or more separate agreements concerning the same property may nevertheless be so related that an action directed to but
one may involve the parties to the others to such an extent that
their joinder is at least an "ought" and perhaps a "must." This
is particularly well exemplified in cases involving petroleum bearing land. In a suit for forfeiture of an oil and gas lease for the sublessee's breach of an implied covenant to protect from drainage,
both the lessee and the sublessee "should" be made parties.261
This is so even though acts constituting grounds for forfeiture of
the parent lease may be committed by a sublessee alone. The
principal lessee's interest is affected, and although there is no fatal
objection to proceeding in absence of the lessee if he proves unavailable, when he is available the court is amply justified in holding that he should be brought in. 262 In Veal v. Thomason 263 the
Texas Supreme Court was concerned with the claimed invalidity
of an oil and gas lease which reserved title in the lessors to oneeighth of the oil but provided that the lessors in similar leases in
the unitized block should participate in the royalties from oil, gas,
or other minerals, "if, when and as produced and sold." The court
of civil appeals had ruled264 that the lessors held absolute title
until the oil was sold, and that the rights of the various other
lessors in the unitized block as regards the royalty earned by any
particular leased tract in the block did not accrue until the owner
of the tract had reduced the royalty to money. It followed that the
claim against such an owner in favor of the other lessors was merely
a money demand, not to be classed as an interest in the land from
which the royalty was derived. Hence, said the lower court in
a trespass to try title action wherein the lease was claimed to be
invalid, the other lessors in the unitized tract were not "necessary"
parties. However, the supreme court, reversing, held that since
a single transaction or purpose was consummated, the unitization
261 Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., IO Cal. (2d) 232, 73 P. (2d) 1163 (1937)
and cases therein cited.
262 Cf. Ambassador Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. 667, 284 P. 445 (1930).
263 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W. (2d) 472 (1942).
264 144 S.W. (2d) 361 (1940).
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contract was single even though the leases were separate.265 The
lessors were joint owners or tenants of all royalties reserved in each
of the several leases in the unitized block, the ownership being
proportionate. Thus, the other lessors or royalty holders were
necessary parties. Said the court, if not joined and the judgment
here were to free this land from the lease, the royalty owners under
the other leases in the unitized block will have had their royalty
interest in this land cut off and destroyed, for all practical purposes,
without their having had a day in court. Without more facts than
appear in the two Veal opinions, the decision of the supreme court
is appropriate enough. Its method plainly is superior to that of
the lower court, which attached controlling importance to distinctions between interests in money and interests in land. Instead,
the higher court looked realistically into the question of the factual
effect on the other parties to the unitization agreement of a possible finding of invalidity of the lease, and it concluded that their
interests-however they may be characterized-might indeed be
adversely affected. In this view the result seems supportable,
although it is difficult to see that joinder of the other parties would
have much effect on the outcome of the case; i.e., it would be
surprising if they could provide much assistance in a trial on the
issue of the validity of the agreement between one lessor and his
lessee. But the possible effect on the others and the inter-relationships inherent in the unitization agreement suggest the need for
an opportunity for them to be heard, and the court so held.
To compare with the preceding cases the decision in McArthur
v. Rosenbaum Co. 266 is to observe again the clear need for deciding
required joinder cases one by one on particular facts. Plaintiff
lessee brought action in federal court against defendant lessor for
a declaratory judgment construing a renewal clause in the lease.
Plaintiff had erected a single building on four tracts, only one of
which was owned by the lessor. Each tract was leased under
virtually identical agreements. As required, plaintiff had erected
his twelve story building in such way as to make possible its division
into four units, with dividing walls on tract lines. Lessors under
the other leases were not here joined, and the joinder would have
destroyed diversity jurisdiction. The Third Circuit held that
205 But d. Jeffers v. Forbes, 28 Kan. 174 (1882). In Hudson v. Newell, (5th Cir. 1949)
174 F. (2d) 546, plaintiffs' disclaimer of an intent to interfere with unitizations formed
before the filing of this action led the court to dispense with joinder of othenvise indispensable parties to the earlier unitizations.
266 (&I Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 617.
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joinder was not required, that the other lessors were not.indispensable parties because (a) the interests of these lessors would not
be "directly affected legally by the adjudication," and (b) failure
to join would not be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
Discussing the latter point, the court noted that although the
other lessors were undoubtedly interested in the result of this case,
the possibility of loss of this tenant had been before them for
the life of the le~se, many years, and the provision for dividing walls
would leave them with separate buildings erected at the tenant's
cost. "If anyone will suffer an inequity it would appear to be the
lessee .... But this is its own fault ...." 267 Actually, it would
seem that the second of the court's two reasons for dispensing with
joinder of the other lessees could be rephrased so that the two
would read: (a) the interests of the lessors would not be directly
affected legally by the adjudication, and (b) the interests of the
lessors would not be directly affected factually by the adjudication.268 And the first of these, as insisted elsewhere herein,269
is empty of meaning, since nothing the court can do will legally
affect the interest of an absent person, in the res judicata sense.
The result's clear dependence on the particular facts, i.e., the
"separability" of the portions of the building, is emphasized by the
court's pains to distinguish the instant case from the decision in
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Barkhausen,210 where on otherwise
comparable facts indispensability was the rule because the twentytwo story building involved housed a theater which could not
reasonably be divided by walls along the lot lines.
It does not surprise that the·courts respond to joinder questions
in deed reformation cases in about the same pattern as in suits
for rescission and cancellation. That is to say, they demand joinder
of all parties to the original transaction,271 holding even that a
judgment of reformation absent the grantor is "fatally defective,"
subject to collateral attack. 272 Yet here too a court can draw from
circumstance- justification for excusing nonjoinder of a party
to the deed, as where objection is untimely273 or the deed-party- has
267 Id. at 622.
268 The attempt is

to rephrase in almost the court's own language. Were further departure considered, the word "directly" should be replaced by "adversely."
269 Text at notes 46-47 supra.
270 (7th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 481.
211 Ford v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., (E.D. S.C. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 347; Eureka Co. v.
Henney Motor Co., (D.C. Del. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 564; Kegel v. McCormack, 225 Wis. 19,
272 N.W. 650 (1937). Cf. Skurski v. Gurski, 329 Mich. 474, 45 N.W. (2d) 359 (1951).
272 Fox v. Faulkner, 222 Ky. 584, 1 S.W. (2d) 1079 (1927).
273 Flowers v. Germann, 211 Minn. 412, 1 N.W. (2d) 424 (1941).
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virtually estopped himself by conceding that the deed contains
error.274
Thus, in a Minnesota case275 the defendants in an ejectment
action asked for reformation of the deeds by which they and plaintiffs obtained title to their lands from common grantors. The trial
court denied reformation and gave judgment for plaintiffs. Not
until the case was on appeal did plaintiffs, as appellees, raise the
issue of nonjoinder of the grantors; and the court held that the
objection came too late unless, without the grantors, no decree
whatever could be made determining the principal issues in the
case. Admitting that a decree in the instant case would not
"'completely settle all the questions which may be involved in
the controversy' so as to 'conclude the rights of all the persons who
have any interest in the subject-matter of the litigation,' " 276 the
court concluded nevertheless that a substantial, meaningful decree
could be made without injuring absent persons and that therefore
the grantors were not required to be present in order for the court
to consider the case, especially since plaintiff did not raise the
nonjoinder question by demurrer or answer in the trial court. It
is true that if plaintiffs lose, as they seem destined to do, they may
bring an action against the grantors for breach of warranties in
the deed-though the facts indicate little chance of success. That is
one more factor to be cast onto the scale in favor of requiring
joinder; but it does not indicate a lack of power in the court to
enter a final judgment without the grantors since the purpose of
the action can be accomplished in their absence. 277
274 Welch

v. Johnson, 93 Ore. 591, 183 P. 776 (1919).
v. Germann, 211 Minn. 412, I N.W. (2d) 424 (1941).
276 Id. at 420. These phrases are derived from a leading Minnesota case, Tatum v.
Roberts, 59 Minn. 52, 60 N.W. 848 (1894), which attempts to define kinds of parties in
equity actions. The definitions make "necessary" parties roughly equivalent to the federal
category of "indispensable" parties, and "proper" about the same as "necessary."
Necessary parties "are those without whom no decree at all can be effectively made
determining the principal issues in the cause." 59 Minn. 52 at 56; these words in turn are
taken from POMEROY, REMEDIF.S AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS, 2d ed., §329 (1883). Proper parties
••are those without whom a substantial decree may be made, but not a decree which shall
completely settle all the questions which may be involved in the controversy, and conclude
the rights of all the persons who have any interest in the subject matter of the litigation."
Ibid. Except that the labels are not those usually employed and understood by lawyers,
these definitions are good. All is common sense and there is no confusion about a lack of
power in either definition. Rather, the concern is whether a decree as to those before the
court will be effective as to the main issues in the case. With these as tools a court could,
if it would, work well.
277 Unfortunately, to an otherwise laudable decision a confusing element is added by
the appellate court's disposition of the case. After holding that the grantors are not "necessary" (meaning "indispensable") parties, and that there must be a reversal on the merits,
i.e., reformation should be decreed, it states that the reversal is without prejudice to the
275 Flowers
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Relevant, though not directly in point, is a Georgia reformation case278 where a real estate agent had inserted the description
of several lots in a blank deed signed by plaintiff so as to convey
not only the intended property but several other lots also, including two mvned by plaintiff's wife.· The wife's presence in the suit
was held not essential.279 Although it would be "better practice"
to have made her a party, she would be benefited by a decree of
reformation, not prejudicially affected, and accordingly joinder
would not be required. This proper concern over the position of
the absent wife is allayed upon the express assumption that if plaintiff wins, the wife is affected favorably, not adversely, and upon
the tacit assumption that if plaintiff loses, the wife still may bring
a suit of her own against defendant. All is well as to the wife.
The tacit assumption, however, poses the problem of a double
burden upon defendant, who, after a successful defense of the first
action, may be summoned to battle again. Where there is a strong
possibility that a defendant may be put to tw~ suits it seems improper for a court to proceed in the absence of an interested person
merely because the absent one cannot conceivably be hurt. A
plaintiff in state cases will not be remediless if joinder is required,
and therefore the value inherent in minimizing litigation and
protecting defendants from repetitious suit may have full play.
If the court is clearly of the opinion that on the merits decision
is to go for plaintiff, then all of this may become surplusage; but
the court should say so: "We find that plaintiff's claim is meritorious. In that view nonjoinder of plaintiff's wife becomes inconsequential." Instead, the implication of the court's language
is that if plaintiff succeeds, the wife will not be hurt and accordingly joinder will not be required. So long as the matter is an
"iffy" one, the court ought specifically to recognize that if defendant wins instead, the absent wife is not hurt (having an unimpaired
claim of her own) but by the same token the defendant may be
prejudiced. The decisional process then would turn into one of an
right of the trial court to hear and consider a motion to join the grantors. "Upon that
court initially rests the burden of determining who should be joined as parties." 211 Minn.
412 at 422. Thus, after holding expressly that the grantors were not "necessary" parties,
the appellate court suggests that the trial court have a whack at the question. Although
the facts indicate that the presence of the grantors would not detract from the force of
defendants' apparent right to reformation, the appellate court, by its disposition of the
case, seems dangerously near contradicting its e.xpressions of opinion on the party question.
278 Parnell v. Wooten, 202 Ga. 443, 43 S.E. (2d)
279 The holding is somewhat less than square.

673 (1947).
A general demurrer having been sus•
tained by the trial court, an amendment to bring in the missing wife was held inappropriate.
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evaluation of interests, with the nod probably going to defendant,
it being possible in all state and many federal cases for plaintiff to
join the wife.
Under a Texas statute, joinder of spouses is required in
reformation pleas involving community property. A case280 in
that state held that a pro forma joinder of the husband satisfies
the requirement, the court saying:
"The test to be applied in determining whether or not
there was a sufficient joinder of all necessary parties plaintiff is whether the judgment, if it had been favorable to the
defendant, would have protected the defendant under a plea
of res judicata against a subsequent suit involving the same
subject matter. If H. E. Flannery and his wife were sufficiently before the court that they would have been barred
from maintaining a second suit involving the same subject
matter against the defendant, then the defendant has no right
to complain of the lack of necessary parties; otherwise he has
such right." 281
This articulate concern lest defendant be subjected to two claims
is what is lacking in the Georgia case.
Compulsory joinder questions in real estate mortgage foreclosures are subject to essentially the same type of analysis as those
in other actions involving land.
The mortgagee's primary objective in foreclosing usually is to
obtain payment of the defaulted obligation out of the security.
To accomplish this, he asks the court to terminate the equities
of redemption of all persons having an interest in the mortgaged
property, that title to the property as it stood before the mortgage
may be vested in a purchaser at judicial sale. The mortgagee wants
to achieve a sale of all the right and title that his mortgage covers,
and the buyer wants to know with some certainty what title it is
that he buys. Only thus can a maximum price be obtained. It
becomes clear that there is good reason to require the presence of
all persons who may have an outstanding interest in or claim against
the property.282 These persons are sometimes termed "necessary,"
280 Wade v. Wade, 140 Tex. 339, 167 S.W. (2d) 1008 (1943).
at 342.
282 "It is manifestly unjust to all persons interested in the proceeds of the sale of the
mortgaged premises that the sale be made subject to an outstanding right to redeem, for
that invariably and inevitably prejudices the sale." Gould v. Wheeler, 28 N.J. Eq. 541 at
542 (1877) (ordering a subsequent mortgagee joined). "[T]he owner of any quantity or
quality of estate in the premises, even in the remotest degree or of the most trifling value,
becomes as necessary a party defendant to perfect the title as the sole owner of the entire
equity of redemption." WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE, 5th ed., §330 (1939). Said one
281 Id.
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in the sense that their joinder as defendants is necessary to the full
accomplishment of the purpose of the foreclosure action.283 •
From here it is simple to go on to a list of types of individuals
who are "necessary" in this sense: 284 e.g., the mortgagor,2815 purchasers from the mortgagor, 286 heirs or devisees of the mortgagor, 287
junior mortgagees,288 subsequent lessees of the mortgagor. 289 The
court with reference to the necessity of joining the mortgagor (pledgor) in a suit to foreclose a pledge of stock: "It is the duty of the security holder to exhaust the security before
he can obtain a deficiency judgment against the indorser or maker. . . . The security
holder cannot reasonably exhaust the security if at the foreclosure sale no one would buy
it, because no one could get a title which would be worth paying IO cents for [, for] the
simple reason that the owner's interest would not be foreclosed." Hoyt v. Upper Marion
Ditch Co., 94 Utah 134 at 147, 76 P. (2d) 234 (1938). See 37 AM. JUR., Mortgages §548. Cf.
O'Brien v. Moffitt, 133 Ind. 660, 33 N.E. 616 (1892); Webb v. Patterson, ll4 Neb. 346 at
351, 207 N.W. 522 (1926).
283

OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §321 (1951); WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE, 5th ed., §329

(1939).
284 WILTSIE, note 283 supra, lists some 51 categories of possible parties and indicates
that 30 of them are or may be "necessary."
285 Goodenow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 461 (1860); Riddick v. Davis, 220 N.C. 120, 16 S.E. (2d)
662 (1941). See Federal Land Bank v. Fjerestad, 66 S.D. 429 at 431, 285. N.W. 298 (1939).
286 Terrell v. Allison, 88 U.S. 289 (1874); Fowler v. Lilly, 122 Ind. 297, 23 N.E. 767
(1889).
287 Chew v. Hyman, (C.C. N.D. Ill. 1881) 7 F. 7; Thomas v. Barnes, 219 Ala. 652,
123 S. 18 (1929); Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474, 83 P. (2d) 709 (1938); Buff v. Schafer,
157 Minn. 485, 196 N.W. 661 (1924). Cf. Reedy v. Camfield, 159 Ill. 254, 42 N.E. 833
(1896); Fraser v. Bean, 96 N.C. 327, 2 S.E. 159 (1887). See Federal Land Bank v. Fjerestad,
66 S.D. 429 at 431, 285 N.W. 298 (1939); and see annotation, 119 A.L.R. 807 (1939). The
result may be othenvise by force of applicable statute. See, e.g., McClung v. Cullison, 15
Okla. 402, 82 P. 499 (1905); Dixon v. Cuyler, 27 Ga. 248 (1859); Tryon v. Munson, 77 Pa.
250 (1874). An executor or personal representative, who does not succeed to the decedentmortgagor's interest in the property, is not a necessary party. Woods v. First Nat. Bank,
(9th Cir. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 856; Heidgerd v. Reis, 135 App. Div. 414, 199 N.Y.S. 921 (1909);
Federal Land Bank v. Fjerestad, supra this note. Cf. Hinkle v. Walker, 213 N.C. 657, 197
S.E. 129 (1938). See Fraser v. Bean, supra this note at 329. Again, the rule is sometimes
othenvise by statute. E.g., Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 58, §252. See Seals v. Chadwick, 18 Del.
381, 45 A. 718 (1900). Or where plaintiff seeks a deficiency judgment against the estate.
Belloc v. Rogers, 9 Cal. 124 (1858); Columbia Theological Seminary v. Arnette, 168 S.C.
272, 167 S.E. 455· (1932). In this latter instance, the estate will be directly affected, and the
personal representative of the deceased mortgagor is, with reason, a necessary party.
288 Mechanics State Bank v. Kramer Service, Inc., 184 Miss. 895, 186 S. 644 ·(1939);
Gould v. Wheeler, 28 N.J. Eq. 541 (1877). But cf. Street v. Beal and Hyatt, 16 Iowa 68
(1861); Harris v. Hooper, 50 Md. 537 (1878); Pierson v. Pierson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939)
128 S.W. (2d) 108, revd. on other grounds, 136 Tex. 310, 150 S.W. (2d) 788 (1941) ("must
be made parties or they are not affected by the foreclosure. . . . That does not mean,
however, that no effective judgment of foreclosure can be had without their. presence in
the suit. It means only that, if the plaintiff wishes to shut off their equity of redemption,
he must make them parties." [128 S.W. (2d) at ll3]); Davis v. Walker, (Tex. Civ. App.
1921) 233 S.W. 521 at 523; and see Stroup v. Rutherford, (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) 238 S.W.
(2d) 612 at 613.
.
Whether a junior mortgagee is a necessary party cannot be answered without asking,
"For what purpose?" For example, if the issue arises between the mortgagor and the
senior mortgagee and the foreclosure sale has already been consummated, failure to have
joined the junior mortgagee is unimportant: he is not a necessary party. Spokane Savings
&: Loan Soc. v. Liliopoulos, 160 Wash. 71, 294 P. 561 (1930). The same issue raised before
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interests of all these individuals must be terminated if the foreclosure action is to accomplish all that it ought. In fact, however,
it is misleading to lump all these types of parties into this one
category. In the first place the question of required joinder seldom arises. It normally is the desire of all who have any interest
in the mortgaged property that it be sold for the highest price
possible, and that can happen only if the buyer can be vested with
title equal to that held by the mortgagor at the time of the mortgage. Hence, we may expect that the parties themselves will take
steps to join all those whose interests are affected and who may
have rights of redemption. In the second place the term "necessary," here as in other areas, is a term of various denotations.200
There seems to be no case, for example, in which a court has had
to refuse, finally, to proceed in the absence of one of these parties,
for the reason that with constructive service of process available
in real property cases a ruling by the court that a party is "necessary" typically leads to the immediate joinder of the missing party
without further compulsion by the court. 291 In such cases, then,
the sale probably will lead to an order requiring the junior mortgagee to be joined: he is
a necessary party. Gould v. Wheeler, supra this note. See Norfolk Bldg. & Loan Assn. v.
Stem, ll3 N.J. Eq. 385 at 387, 167 A. 32 (1933); Morris v. Wheeler, 45 N.Y. 708 at 7ll
(1871). See also note, 88 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 994 (1940).
Prior mortgagees ordinarily are not necessary parties in a foreclosure action by a
junior mortgagee. Jerome v. Mccarter, 94 U.S. 734 (1876); Cone Bros. Construction Co. v.
Moore, 141 Fla. 420, 193 S. 288 (1940). See Raymond v. Holbom, 23 Wis. 57 at 63 (1868).
Although there is some authority to the effect that holders of superior interests are not
even proper parties (e.g., Cone Bros. Construction Co. v. Moore, supra), the weight of
authority indicates that sucll persons may be joined. In certain ciraimstances it has been
held that they must be joined, as where sale of the entire property and estate, and not
merely the equity of redemption, is desired. This is requisite so that the amount of prior
encumbrances can be fixed and paid out, and the purcllaser protected. See Jerome v.
McCarter, supra this note, at 735-736; San Francisco v. Lawton, 18 Cal. 465 (1861).
289 Cf. Dundee Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell, 65 Fla. 15, 61 S. 108 (1913); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs, 230 N.Y. 285, 130 N.E. 295 (1921); Stark v. Super-Cold Southwest Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) 239 S.W. (2d) 402; Thomely v. Andrews, 40 Wash. 580, 82
P. 899 (1905). But cf. McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860); Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. Herlin, 299 Ill. App. 429, 20 N.E. (2d) 333 (1939); Dolese v. Bellows-Claude Neon
Co., 261 Micll. 57, 245 N.W. 569 (1932). The result may depend on whether the state
adheres to the title or lien theory of mortgages, and on whether the tenant in possession
holds under the mortgagor. See comment, 17 WASH. L. R.Ev. 37 (1942); Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. Hedin, supra this note (question raised for first time on appeal: court implied that different result should obtain in trial court); Stroup v. Rutherford, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951) 238 S.W. (2d) 612.
200 "[I]n this context as in most contexts 'necessary' means convenient. Or do you
prefer to say it means very convenient or very, very convenient." DURFEE, CASES oN SECUR·
ITY 204 (1951).
201 However, see Gould v. Wheeler, 28 N.J. Eq. 541 (1877), in whicll a stay of the
proceedings was ordered pending the joining of a subsequent mortgagee; 418 Trading
Corp. v. Moon Realty Corp., 285 App. Div. 444, 137 N.Y.S. (2d) 513 (1955). Cf. Nashville
& Decatur R.R. v. Orr, 85 U.S. 471 (1873).
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there is no cause to determine indispensability as distinguished
from necessary joinder. This is true, also, where for reasons sufficient to the parties joinder is dispensed with by consent. There
can be no harm to those not joined,292 so that a court has no cause
to raise the question-on its own motion.
There seem to be but two ways in which the question of indispensability arises. One, there may be an objection on appeal
to the failure below _to have joined the holder of a particular interest. The counter argument offered may be that the nonjoinder
was not mentioned below and may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. The latter argument cannot prevail if the court holds
the party indispensable.293 Two, in a later suit (a subsequent
foreclosure, or a different kind of proceeding, as, for example,
ejectment) the original foreclosure proceeding may be challenged
as void for lack of a party.294 The number of cases upholding such
challenge is inconsiderable. The courts regularly hold that failure to join this lienholder or that claimant renders the action
below ineffective as to him. But as emphasized repeatedly herein,
that is quite a different thing from holding the action ineffective
to foreclose interests which were represented in the original proceeding.295
There do appear from time to time statements to the effect
that since the principal purpose of a foreclosure suit is to terminate
the equity of redemption, the owner of that equity must be made
a party.296 This means, ordinarily, the original mortgagor; and
in the simple case where he has not encumbered the property additionally or transferred all or a part of it to another person, he is
spoken of as the only defendant necessary.297 But this is hardly
more than to say that if B wants to recover money from A, he must
292 I.e., their interests simply remain unaffected by the adjudication in their absence.
Terrell v. Allison, 88 U.S. 289 (1874); Riddick v. Davis, 220 N.C. 120, 16 S.E. (2d) 662
(1941).
293 Thomas v. Barnes, 219 Ala. 652, 123 S. 18 (1929) (heirs of mortgagor held "indispensable" in this sense); Hambrick v. Russell, 86 Ala. 199, 5 S. 298 (1888) (mortgagee held
"indispensable" in this sense in foreclosure instituted by assignee of mortgage debt);
Langley v. Andrews, 132 Ala. 147, 31 S. 469 (1902) (same). Cf. Reader v. District Court,
98 Utah 1, 94 P. (2d) 858 (1939).
294 Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209, 23 P. 106 (1890); Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan.
474, 83 P. (2d) 709 (1938).
295 This discussion emphasizes the rules in state courts. If federal jurisdiction in these
matters be explored, one comes upon the diversity problem as a third instance _in which
the indispensability question may arise. Cf. Woods v. First National Bank, (9th Cir. 1926)
16 F. (2d) 856. See generally section III-D infra.
296 See, e.g., Riddick v. Davis, 220 N.C. 120, 16 S.E. (2d) 662 (1941); Federal Land Bank
v. Fjerestad, 66 S.D. 429, 285 N.W. 298 (1939).
297 Carpenter v. Ingalls, 3 S.D. 49, 51 N.W. 948 (1892).
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sue A. If he comes into court and says that process has not been
served on A and that A is nowhere about, but that a judgment
against A is desired, the indicated result is a dismissal. So it is that
if a mortgagee wants to foreclose the mortgagor's interest in the
security (and, probably, to obtain a deficiency judgment against
him),298 he must sue the mortgagor. One can think of few circumstances in which foreclosure of the interest of the mortgagor or his
successor in interest is not vital to the success of a foreclosure proceeding. In this sense the mortgagor is indispensable.299 So, in
this sense, are all persons whose interests the mortgagee wants to
foreclose: their interests can be cut off only if they are made parties.
However, it is conceivable that in a given instance, the mortgagee may be willing that the foreclosure sale vest in the purchaser
something less than unencumbered title. The sale price will be
less and the omission is not to be encouraged,300 but there is no
generally accepted principle which makes the proceeding fatally
defective for failure to join any particular interest. It simply is
ineffective as to those not joined but is valid as to those who were. 301
Indeed, one author suggests that since the word "necessary" is
of "relative signification,"302 there is no such thing as a "necessary"
(in the sense of "indispensable," apparently) party defendant m
foreclosure cases.303 .
20s Obviously, if the creditor wants a deficiency judgment against the original mortgagor who has conveyed the property to another, the mortgagor must be joined. See Johnson v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 46 Cal. App. (2d) 546 at 548, ll6 P. (2d) 167 (1941);
Dennis v. Ivey, 134 Fla. 181 at 185, 183 S. 624 (1938). But cf. Vanderspeck v. Federal Land
Bank, 175 Miss. 759, 167 S. 782 (1936); Methvin v. American Savings &: L. Assn., 194 Okla.
288, 151 P. (2d} 370 (1944). Guarantors of the mortgage note are not necessary parties;
suit against them for the balance of the note in default may be brought before foreclosure,
or after a foreclosure proceeding to whicll the guarantors were not parties. Berea· College
v. Killian, 304 Ill. App. 296, 26 N.E. (2d) 650 (1940); Prevatt v. Federal Land Bank, 129
Fla. 464, 176 S. 494 (1937) (rule extends to co-makers and endorsers if they have no
interest in the mortgaged property).
200 Terrell v. Allison, 88 U.S. 289 (1874).
300 See the quotation from Hoyt v. Upper Marion Di tell Co., note 282 supra.
301 "[The mortgagor's grantee] should have been made a party to the foreclosure suit.
His rights could not be cut off by that proceeding, unless he was made a party thereto.
But the decree was not, for that reason, a void decree.•.• The failure to make him a
party ... does not affect the validity of the decree, but simply leaves his right of redemption unimpaired•..• Although the grantee of the mortgagor, who is not a party, is not
affected, yet his interest, whicll remains the same, is only a right to redeem. By the foreclosure and sale and the master's deed thereunder, the legal title becomes vested in the
grantee in sucll deed, and leaves nothing in the mortgagor, or his grantees, who are not
parties to the proceeding, except the right to redeem in equity." Walker v. Warner, 179
Ill. 16 at 23-24, 53 N.E. 594 (1899). The cases in note 294 supra are the exception, not
the rule.
302 I.e., its meaning must relate to the objective or purpose of the mortgagee.
303 WILTSIB, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE, 5th ed., §329 (1939). Cf. DURFEE, CASES ON. SE·
CURITY 204 (1951).

514

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 55

The authorities discussed in the preceding half dozen paragraphs involve, generally, a debtor-mortgagor or parties deriving
their interests through him. Much of what is there said is applicable equally to those who have creditor interests, although these
latter belong in the category of parties plaintiff. If they are held
necessary but refuse to associate themselves as plaintiffs, they will
be brought in as defendants. Only a mortgagee or someone claiming through him can have any reason for seeking foreclosure, and
usually he commences the action voluntarily. Hence, by comparison with required joinder questions as to persons holding
debtor interests the number of such problems as to creditors is
minute.
A suit for foreclosure is normally brought by the mortgagee
or, if he has assigned his interest, by his assignee or transferee. If
the mortgage is held by a single creditor and the obligation and
the security interest in the mortgaged property have not been
divorced, there is no joinder problem. Any issue of the propriety
of his bringing the suit will relate to the question of who is the real
party in interest, a (substantive law) question not within the purview of this discussion. But where two or more have an interest in
the secured obligation, or where the obligation is held by one and
the security title by another, it may become necessary to decide
which of the creditors and title holders must be made parties.
Foreclosure, of course, assumes the existence of a secured obligation in default. Necessarily, then, the holder of the obligation
must be a party to the foreclosure proceedings to establish the
amount of the obligation, his ownership of it and the fact that it
is in default. 304 It has been stated that where two or more have
an interest in the ownership of the lien, all must be joined, as
plaintiffs if willing, as defendants if not. 305 There is a substantial
body of cases holding co-mortgagees to be "necessary" parties,306
304 Bennett v. Taylor, 5 Cal. 502 (1855); Bergen v. Urhahn, 83 N.Y. 49 (1880). "[T]he
finding of tbe amount due, for nonpayment of which, according to tbe terms of tbe decree,
tbe mortgaged property is ordered to be sold, is tbe foundation of tbe right of tbe mort•
gagee further to proceed. . . ." Chicago 8: Vincennes R.R. v. Fosdick, 106 U.S. 47 at 71
(1882).
.
305 Holm v. Goodley Holding Corp., 164 Misc. 45, 295 N.Y.S. 885 (1937) (holder of a
junior participating interest in a first mortgage required to bring in his assignor who was
present holder of tbe senior participating interest). Cf. Webb v: Patterson, 114 Neb. 346,
207 N.W. 522 (1926).
306 Hopkins v. Ward, 51 Ky. 185 (1851); Blanchard v. Baldwin, 88 N.H. 423, 190 A.
285 (1937); Oppenheimer v. Schultz, 107 N.J. Eq. 192, 152 A. 323 (1930); Flemming v.
Iuliano, 92 N.J. Eq. 685, 114 A. 786 (1921); Lowe v. Morgan, 1 Bro. Ch. 368, 28 Eng. Rep.
1183 (1784). Cf. Goodall v. Mopley, 45 Ind. 355 (1873). See Porter v. Clements, 3 Ark.
364 at 382 (1841); Tyler v. Yreka Water Co., 14 Cal. 212 at 219 (1859); and see W1LtsIE,
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE, 5tb ed., §§318, 396 (1939).

1957]

COMPULSORY

JOINDER

OF PARTIES

515

but there also are cases holding that one co-mortgagee can sue
alone. 307 This serves but to demonstrate again the impropriety
of labeling any one class of persons "necessary" or "indispensable"
at all times and in all circumstances.308 Instead, each case should
be examined on its facts. Why is co-mortgagee A not joined?
Will the mortgagor be harmed by his absence? Will A himself be
harmed? In Nashville & Decatur R.R. v. Orr,309 railroad bonds
were secured by a mortgage which ran not to a trustee but directly
to the persons holding the bonds, who were named and their
several interests described. The mortgagor defaulted, and Orr,
a bondholder, suing for himself and for others who might intervene and contribute to the expenses of the suit, sought to foreclose.
There was substantial doubt that the security was adequate. The
Supreme Court dismissed Orr's bill on the ground that with the
security insufficient Orr's success likely would be prejudicial to
the interests of the absent bondholders covered by the same mortgage. "Each holder, therefore, should be present, both that he
may defend his own claims and that he may attack the other claims
should there be just occasion for it. . . . If . . . there should be
a deficiency in the security, real or apprehended, every one interested should have notice in advance of the time, place, and mode
of sale, that he may make timely arrangements to secure a sale
of the property at its full value."310 This is a sensible result,
reached upon inquiry into facts far more pertinent than such
matters as whether Orr and the other bondholders were joint
tenants or tenants in common or totally separate in their interests.
The hoJders of the security interest in the land should be made
parties in order to enable the court to vest in the foreclosure sale
purchaser the entire title to the property as of the time the mortgage
was given.311 This may be true even where the titleholder never
307 Brown v. Bates, 55 Me. 520 (1868) (statute may have had an effect on the result);
Thayer v. Campbell, 9 Mo. 277 (1845); Montgomerie v. Marquis of Bath, 3 Ves. Jr. 560,
l!O Eng. Rep. ll55 (1797). Cf. Platt v. Squire, 53 Mass. 494 (1847). See Cochran v. Goodell,
Hll Mass. 464 at 466 (1881).
308 It may be possible to explain (if not justify) the division of authority between
footnotes 306 and 307 in orthodox joint-several terms: the cases in the former involved
what the courts commonly call "joint" interests, whereas the co-mortgagees in the latter
note's cases had "separate" interests, i.e., they were tenants in severalty or in common.
But d. WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE, 5th ed., §318 (1939): "Where a mortgage is owned
in severalty, it is indispensable [sic] that all the interests be represented in an action to
foreclose. All co-mortgagees must be made parties."
309 85 U.S. 471 (1873).
310 Id. at 475.
311 Cf. Goodenow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 461 at 469 (1860); Champion v. Hinkle, 45 N.J. Eq.
162 at 165, 16 A. 701 (1888).

516

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 55

had312 or has divested himself 0£3 13 an interest m the obligation
which the title was given to secure.
These are the general principles. To simple cases the application is simple. In complex cases-for example, trust indenture
mortgages securing corporate bonds314-the problems are harder
but the litigation is cut to the same pattern.
It will have been apparent from all this that the purposes of
foreclosure proceedings are best and most fairly effectuated by
bringing before the court all persons who may have any interest
in or claim to the property, whether as debtor, creditor, or otherwise. Because construct:ive service of process may be employed to
gain jurisdiction over these interests and claims and their holders
to the extent of the property itself, one would expect the courts
always to insist upon joinder. This is especially true in the light
of the interest of the public and of the defendant in avoiding multiple litigation and the desire to deal cleanly with property titles.
Indeed there is something akin to a presumption in favor of
joinder: "The courts should be particularly jealous of the integrity of judicial sales."315 And the strong interest of the parties in
wrapping up the whole matter in one package normally leads to
an avoidance of any nonjoinder issue. Nevertheless there are
instances in which the petitioner fails to join interested persons; 316
and in some of these the courts do not insist on joinder,31 ' noting
that the foreclosure action is without prejudice to the absent persons' interests. These cases run counter to the "presumption"
that joinder will be required. But in each the court has concluded
312 As intimated, at least, in Chrisman v. Chenoweth, 81 Ind. 401 (1882).
313 Flagg v. Florence Discount Co., 228 Ala. 153, 153 S. 177 (1934). This

applies, of
course, only to title theory jurisdictions.
314 The requirement of joinder depends on the wording of the indenture. The trustee,
as holder of title to the security, must be a party. See Busch v. City Trust Co., 101 Fla. 392,
134 S. 226 (1931); 37 AM. JUR., Mortgages §§545, 547. Ordinarily, the indenture precludes
the bondholders from instituting foreclosure, even though they are the "real" creditors. See
OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §320 (1951).
.
315 First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v. McNiel, 177 S.C. 332 at 343, 181 S.E. 21
(1935).
316 It is quite possible, of course, that the plaintiff has a legitimate reason for omitting
certain persons. See, e.g., Cody Trust Co. v. Hotel Clayton Co., 293 Ill. App. 1, 12 N.E. (2d)
32 (1937) (mortgage bondholders were not joined because they were numerous and were
adequately represented by the trustee); Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Atlantic City Jewish
Community Center, 14 N.J. Misc. 1, 181 A. 700 (1935), affd. 121 N.J. Eq. 110, 187 A. 372
(1936). The local procedure for substituted service may be expensive and difficult; and of
course due process must be complied with. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
317 "That [i.e., joinder of trust deed beneficiaries] they dispensed with, why should not
the court? Their absence does not render the bill defective." Continental Bank &: Trust
Co. v. Fulton Realty Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1105 at 1110, 162 A. 560 (1932).
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from the facts that (1) there was a good reason why joinder had not
been effected and (2) the action would accomplish something
significant for the parties without prejudice to any person not
present.318 One does not regret the deviations from general rule,
but rather recognizes that the general rule allows-indeed requires
-a case-by-case determination of the factual need for joinder, and
that there are situations where joinder may be excused without
apology.

D.

In Cases Where Federal Jurisdiction Is Bottomed on
Diversity of Citizenship
(A Dimension ls Added)

In the main, compulsory joinder presents the same questions
in the federal courts as in state courts. The considerations that
move a court to one determination or another are not greatly different. Indeed the familiar formulations of required joinder rules
utilized by all courts, both state and federal, derive principally
from federal cases where jurisdiction was supported by diversity
of citizenship,319 and in diversity cases the question of indispensability well may be decided upon the basis of state rules. To the
extent that required joinder is determined by reference to the
character of the parties' rights or interests the problem is essentially
substantive and must be settled by reference to the governing lawusually state,320 under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,8 21 but sometimes
federal, as, for example, where copyrights and patents are involved.322
Where, however, the question of indispensability
318 Note the emphasis upon particular facts in this statement: "It is well recognized
that a Court of Equity has wide discretion in determining who are necessary parties in a
case of this sort. Conceding the general rule to require that a trustee be made a party for
the purpose of divesting his title and removing this cloud, the situation here was exceptional. When the record disclosed that this corporate trustee was not only insolvent and
had ceased to do business for many years, with such assets as it possessed being administered
by a receiver, who appeared and disclaimed and renounced the right or authority to perform the functions of this trust, and that, further more, while technically a separate entity,
this trustee was a subsidiary, an arm of the mortgagee bringing the suit, which owned all
of the capital stock of the corporate trustee, we think the chancellor was well within the
discretion and jurisdictional powers vested in him in proceeding as he did.... 'The modern
tendency in all progressive jurisdiction is away from formal defects and distinctions, not
affecting the merits.'" Lawman v. Barnett, 180 Tenn. 546 at 569-570, 177 S.W. (2d) 121
(1944). See also the cases in note 316 supra.
319 The most important of which is Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 130 (1854).
320 Kroese v. General Castings Corp., (3d Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 760, cert. den. 339 U.S.
983 (1950); Young v. Garrett, (8th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 223; Platte v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co., (D.C. Neb. 1946) 6 F.R.D. 475.
321304 U.S. 64 (1938).
322 Stuff v. La Budde Feed & Grain Co., (E.D. Wis. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 493.
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depends on whether the court can do justice to the parties in court
without injuring the rights of absent persons, the problem is
said to be procedural and governed by federal rules. 323
Nevertheless, elements substantially foreign to the usual purpose of the joinder inquiry do exist in one important class of federal
cases-those in which jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of
citizenship. It is a familiar fact that federal district courts may
entertain civil suits involving more than $3000 between parties
who are "Citizens of different States. " 324 Since 1806, the date of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss,3 25 it has been considered settled that
the quoted phrase contemplates so-called complete diversity; i.e.,
no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants, irrespective of the number of litigants plaintiff or defendant.326 Thus, although a case may lie properly in the federal courts
so long as B of Michigan is plaintiff and C of New York is defendant, adding D of New York as plaintiff or E of Michigan as defendant normally will oust federal jurisdiction. At once it is apparent
that, as in Shields v. Barrow,321 a decision that a defendant from the
same state as plaintiff (or that a plaintiff from defendant's state)
is "indispensable" must effectually end consideration of the case
by the federal court, since his joinder would destroy the basis
of jurisdiction.328 Federal rule 19 (b) provides that when a person is not indispensable but ought to be a party if complete relief
is to be accorded between those already parties-in the terminology of Shields v. Barrow a "necessary" party-the court in its
discretion may proceed without him where his joinder would
deprive the court of jurisdiction of the parties before it.329 This
323 Ford v. Adkins, (E.D. Ill. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 472. It is doubtful that this separation
of the joinder inquiry into two elements is especially meaningful, although as made in
3 OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 354-358 (1948), it is approved by Judge Goodrich in Kroese
v. General Castings Corp., note 320 supra, at 761-762, n.l. Professor Moore argues for
determination according to federal rules [3 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., §19.07, pp.
2152-2153 (1948)], but his explanation of his position ranges him very nearly alongside
Mr. Ohlinger. To the extent that they differ, see the criticism, in Judge Goodrich's
opinion.
824 228 U.S.C. (1952) §1332 (a).
325 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 267 (1806).
826 Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941).
327 17 How. (58 U.S.) 130 (1854).
328 But cf. Washington v. United States, (9th Cir. 1936) 87 F. (2d) 421 at 427.
329 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 (b): "When persons -ivho are not indispensable, but who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already
parties, have not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to
both service of process and venue and can be made parties without depriving the court
of jurisdiction of the parties before it, the court shall order them summoned to appear in
the action. The court in its discretion may proceed in the action without making such
persons parties, if its jurisdiction over them as to either service of process or venue can
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may be regarded as a left-handed limitation on the doctrine of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss. Though phrased in permissive terms, the
very presence of the rule seems to direct the federal courts to accept
all diversity cases which legally they can.330 They will reject cases
where there is absent an "indispensable" party, because they must;
this, of course, is the rule in all courts, state and federal. The
federal courts may accept cases when a "necessary" party is beyond
reach of process, because by definition a necessary party is dispensable under such circumstance; this, too, is consonant with state
practice. But the federal courts may proceed without a "necessary"
party whose joinder, although he is within the state, would destroy
diversity or would pose venue problems; there seems nothing
exactly like this in state court practice.331
Two principal and interrelated questions are presented.
First, should the "line" between indispensable and necessary
parties be drawn at the same place in federal diversity cases as in
the state courts? Second, should rule 19 (b) and its antecedents332
be supported as providing for the maintenance of federal diversity
jurisdiction at, virtually, its maximum?
Although this is not the place for an extended restatement of
the familiar controversy over diversity jurisdiction, some position
with respect thereto must be taken, because one's notions about the
propriety of concurrent jurisdiction in the federal courts bear
heavily upon his answers to the two questions just stated. If a
party is indispensable and joinder will destroy diversity, the case
must be dismissed from federal court; if only necessary, the case
may continue under rule 19 (b). A desire to maintain or extend
concurrent jurisdiction may well incline a court toward a holding
of dispensability, and a desire to restrict that jurisdiction, toward
indispensability. As suggested above, rule 19 (b) seems founded
be acquired only by their consent or voluntary appearance or if, though they are subject
to its jurisdiction, their joinder would deprive the court of jurisdiction of the parties
before it; but the judgment rendered therein does not affect the rights or liabilities of
absent persons."
The rule was not an innovation in 1938. Its substance had been embodied in statute
and recognized in court long before. See, e.g., 5 Stat. 321 (1839); Barney v. Baltimore, 6
Wall. (73 U.S.) 280 (1867); and see Federal Equity Rule 39, 226 U.S. 659 (1912). Cf.
Cameron v. M'Roberts, 3 Wheat. (16 U.S.) 591 (1818).
sso Although this is regarded as the general tenor of rule 19 (b), the court is not
required to proceed in the excusable absence of a necessary party. The discretion to proceed implies discretion not to proceed. Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, (D.C.
Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 222.
331 But see Stevens, "Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure," 49 MrcH. L. REv.
307 at 325-331 (1951).
332 See note 329 supra.
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on a policy favoring maximum exercise of federal jurisdiction.
Apparently, however, the only federal opinion which expressly
acknowledges the liberalizing effect of a desire to retain jurisdiction-and, even then, the acknowledgment is tucked away in a footnote-is that of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Brown v. Christman: 333 "The courts of the United States tend
to relax the rules as to the necessity for joinder.... This liberality in applying the rules as to necessary joinder is due in large
measure to the exigencies of exercising jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship."
The desirability of diversity jurisdiction has been the subject
of prolonged and sometimes heated334 debate in legal periodicals,330
with little effect upon the rules. 336 With all respect for the fetish
of seeking out the intent of the constitutional fathers, 337 the more
fruitful inquiry is into the need and justification for concurrent
federal jurisdiction today. From an academic point of view, it is
hard to justify concurrent jurisdiction in its present form. Shopping between forums is an unfortunate operation with no necessary relation to the justice of the case.338 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins3 39
has reduced that activity as to substantive law, and the trend of
state practice rules toward the federal rules is certain to reduce
in number the procedural distinctions between the two systems
333126 F. (2d) 625 at 631-632, n.23 (1942). The cases cited by the court reach "liberal"
results, but they do not expressly acknowledge a "tendency to relax" rules of joinder.
334 See Frankfurter, "Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and State
Courts,'' 13 CoRN. L.Q. 499 (1928); Yntema and Jaffin, "Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction,'' 79 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 869 (1931); Frankfurter, "A Note on Diversity
Jurisdiction-In Reply to Professor Yntema,'' 79 UNIV. PA. L. REv 1097 (1931). The
Frankfurter view, expressed with undiminished assurance, appears most recently in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 at 53 (1954) (concurring).
335 See, e.g., the list of articles in Wechsler, "Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of
the Judicial Code,'' 13 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB, 216 at 235, n.93 (1948). And see Pound,
"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice," 29 A.B.A.
REP. 395 at 411-412 (1906).
386 For a list of the principal statutory changes in diversity jurisdiction of the federal
trial courts, see Frankfurter, "Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and
State Courts,'' 13 CoRN. L.Q. 499 at 511-514 (1928). To this list should be added the federal
interpleader acts [39 Stat. 929 (1917); 43 Stat. 976 (1925); 44 Stat. 416 (1926); 49 Stat. 1096
(1936), 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§1335, 1397, 2361] and the statute extending diversity jurisdiction to citizens of the District of Columbia and territories [54 Stat. 143 (1940), 28 U.S.C.
(1952) §1332 (b)].
337 See Yntema and Jaffin, "Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction;" 79
UNIV. PA. L. REV. 869 (1931).
338 But cf. Horowitz, "Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Test to Determine Those Rules of
State Law to which Its Doctrine Applies,'' 23 So. CAL. L. REv. 204 at 219 (1950), suggesting
that forum shopping to avoid a restrictive state rule is not evil where the state rule rests
on no stronger policy than one of reducing the amount of litigation in the state courts.
339 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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of courts. But these things do not strike at the heart of the problem.
It is usually asserted that the rationale of diversity jurisdiction
is the possibility of state court prejudice against a litigant when out
of his home state.340 There is a difference of opinion as to the
contemporary reality and importance of prejudice of this kind. 341
Unfortunately, as has been pointed out, there is little objective
evidence one way or the other,342 although the persistence of the
view that access to the federal courts is essential to justice for the
non-resident is itself some objective evidence that local prejudice
exists. If in truth this be the raison d'etre of diversity jurisdiction,
then plainly that jurisdiction "is not defined in terms that are
responsive to the theory."343 For example, diversity jurisdiction
holds even though neither party is a resident of the state where
the action is brought; it is not limited to jury cases; it permits a
corporation whose stockholders all are citizens of state X and whose
,operations are entirely in state X to litigate a claim against a citizen of that same state in the federal court simply because it happens
to be, or is designedly, incorporated in state Y.344 Moreover, there .
are other prejudices, such as those directed to race and religious
faith, probably more damaging than simple distrust of a
'foreigner," for which there is no such major remedy as removal
to another system of courts.345 The critics of diversity jurisdiction
-concede that, in any given case, there may well be very real prejudgments based upon irrelevant factors of this kind, and that
:Some protection is indicated; but if the federal courts are to be
4

840 "The constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire)
that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might some•
times obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice. Hence, in controversies between states; between citizens of different states;
between citizens claiming grants under different states; between a state and its citizens, or
foreigners, and between citizens and foreigners, it enables the parties, under the authority
of congress, to have the controversies heard, tried, and determined before the national
tribunals. No other reason than that which has been stated can be assigned, why some,
at least, of those cases should not have been left to the cognizance of the state courts."
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304 at 347 (1816). See also Parker, "The Fed•eral Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It," 18 A.B.A.J. 433 at 437 (1932).
841 For a statement of both views, see WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS, c.12 (1949).
342 Id. at 259-262; Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts-Comments by Members of
·Chicago University Law Faculty, 31 MICH. L. REv. 59 at 61 (1932).
843 Wechsler, "Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code," 13 LAw
-&: CoNTEM. PROB. 216 at 236 (1948).
344 Id. at 236-237; Frankfurter, "Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
.and State Courts,'' 13 CORN. L.Q. 499 at 525-527 (1928).
845 Wechsler, "Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code," 13 LAw
.& CoNTEM. PROB. 216 at 236 (1948).
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made available to guard against local prejudi~e,346 the diversity
rule is a remarkably broad remedy, and in its place should be a
provision, after the fashion of the common change-of-venue rules~
for removal in those cases where local bias is shown.347
Although early abandonment of concurrent jurisdiction is not
seriously expected in any quarter, attacks upon some phases of that
jurisdiction continue, aimed at eliminating its more vulnerable
features. And there have been significant retreats by those heretofore advocating the status quo. For example, the Committee
on Jurisdiction and Venue of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, in its report dated March 12, 1951,348 recommended the
retention of diversity jurisdiction but recommended also that
the Judicial Code be amended to set the jurisdictional minimum at
$7500 and to provide that a corporation may not invoke federal
jurisdiction in a state in which it is doing business and from which
-it receives more than half its gross income.349 Chairman of this
committee is Judge John J. Parker, who more than twenty years
ago, wrote one of the most vigorous defenses of concurrent jurisdiction.350 The 1951 report was circulated throughout the federal
judiciary, and by the time the Judicial Conference next met, in
September, 1951, the latter recommendation had been changed,
at the suggestion of the Tenth Circuit, to provide that in cases
based on diversity of citizenship a corporation should be deemed a
citizen both of the state of its creation and of the state in which
it has its principal place of business.351 The conference approved
846 Apparently there is little demand for federal jurisdiction to protect against other
prejudices, reliance being placed rather on state remedies. This should be qualified by
noting that in extreme cases an appeal may be made to the Supreme Court on due process
grounds.
847 In 1945 a bill was introduced in the Senate which would have restricted diversity
jurisdiction to cases removed from a state court by a non-resident defendant "when it
shall be made to appear to said district court that from prejudice or local influence he
will not be able to obtain justice in such State court.•.." S.466 (as amended), 79th Cong.,
1st sess. See Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on S.466, '79th Cong., 1st
sess. I (1945).
In New York Central R.R. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310 (1929), a judgment obtained in a
federal district court in Missouri and affirmed by the circuit court of appeals was reversed
by the Supreme Court because of remarks of trial counsel designed to appeal improperly
to sectional and local prejudice. That a state court, especially an elected one, might not
· be so ready to reverse is argued in Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts-Comment by
Members of Chicago University Law Faculty, 31 MICH. L. R.Ev. 59 at 61 (1932).
See also WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 264-268 (1949);
McGovney, "A Supreme Court Fiction," 56 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 853, 1090, 1225 at 1257 (1943).
848 Mimeographed.
349 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 210 (1951).
350 Parker, "The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It," 18 A.B.A.J. 433
(1932).
851 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 27 (1951). This is the
test specified in the jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. 30 Stat. 545 (1898),
11 u.s.c. (1952) §11 (1946).

1957]

COMPULSORY ] OINDER OF

p ARTIES

523

the recommendations and authorized the committee to be of any
possible service to Congress in its consideration of the legislative
changes proposed.352 In April of 1952, Representative Celler
introduced a bill to effect the change with regard to corporations,353 but it died in committee. Bills to increase the minimum
amount in controversy have been numerous in recent sessions, but
none has passed.854 If modifications of this kind are made soon,
the criticisms of diversity jurisdiction are likely to become less
pointed and more theoretical. Hence, wise or unwise, concurrent
jurisdiction probably will be with us for years to come. One cannot escape the facts, however, that the principal justification offered
for diversity jurisdiction in its present or proposed form is that it
is a weapon against denial of justice through local prejudice, and
that it is ill designed for that end. To avoid injustice in particular
instances, we have opened the federal courts to a large class of cases,
many, perhaps most, of which do not in fact involve any prejudice
whatever. One ordinarily does not kill a housefly (or even a
hornet) with a ten-pound sledge.
Implicit in the foregoing is the question whether a court-any
court-should take into consideration the availability of another
forum when deciding indispensability questions. Should the court
of state X be more ready to dismiss in the absence of an indispensable party if there is a good chance that all persons interested can
be brought into court in state Y? And what of a federal court
which will have to dismiss for incomplete diversity if A is joinedshould it take into account the possibility of a complete remedy in
some state court when deciding whether A is indispensable (and
so dismiss) or only necessary (and so proceed under rule 19 (b)
without him)? The cases do not afford a clear answer to these
questions, but common sense indicates an affirmative answer to
each.855 As indicated repeatedly above, a court should consider
carefully the harm which may be done to the interest of an absent
person, and it should avoid making meaningless and incomplete
determinations; but it must seek also to avoid a ruling which serves,
352 REPoRT OF TIIE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TilE UNITED STATES 27 (1951). See also
REPORT OF TIIE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TilE UNITED STATES 15 (1952).
858 H.R. 7623, 82d Cong., 2d sess. (1952).
854 See, e.g., H.R.· 5007, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955); H.R. 4266, 83d Cong., 1st sess.
(1953); H.R. 78, 1328, 1988, and 3098, and S. 1593, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951); H.R. 3643,
3763, 3868, 4938, 6435, and 9306, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950). See also Yntema and Jaffin,
"Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction," 79 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 869 at 873, n.7
(1931).
855 Cf. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Busby, (N.D. Ala. 1950) 87 F. Supp. 505; Martin v. Chandler,
(S.D. N.Y. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 131; Latrobe Elec. Steel Co. v. Vascoloy-Ramet Corp., (D.C.
Del. 1944) 55 F. Supp 347.
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in effect, to deprive a plaintiff of all opportunity for a judicial
determination of the merits of his claim. If plaintiff clearly has.
a remedy elsewhere should he seek to pursue it, it is not especially
serious if he be sent out of this court for non-joinder of A; and
it should not require much of an adverse effect on A to cause the
court, on motion of a party or sua sponte, to move to protect A
by ordering him joined on pain of dismissal of the action. But
if the plaintiff likely cannot maintain his action elsewhere-due
to limitations on the jurisdictional reach of the various courtsthen the court ought to consider every means available to retain
his case for adjudication,356 including a careful weighing of the
likelihood of factual injury to A's interest and its relative value,
and a consideration of the possibility of shaping a decree to grant
plaintiff as much merited relief as possible while safeguarding A's
interest.357 This procedure surely may be employed by state
courts; nothing in the:; concept of state autonomy prevents one court
from noting the availability of a forum in a sister state (or a federal
forum). One unsympathetic with concurrent jurisdiction may
argue that a federal court not only may, but indeed should look
to the jurisdictional availability of a state court. To a substantial
extent rule 19 (b) countermands this procedure, but not entirely.
First, as noted,358 the rule permits a court to refuse to proceed even
where A is only necessary, and this refusal may be based on the
feeling that the case would be better disposed of in one package
in a state court. Second, the indispensable necessary line still is a
vague shadow zone, and the conclusion that a unitary determination in a state tribunal is preferable may well lead to a holding of
indispensability and a refusal to proceed, even though in absence
of an alternative state jurisdiction the same federal court might
strain to hold A only necessary and so proceed ·without him.
The more serious problem is presented by the case where all
facts seem to indicate that A's interest will be adversely affected
356 Certainly it does not help for the court merely to express sympathy for his predicament, as in Baker v. Dale, (W.D. Mo. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 364 at 370.
357 An excellent example of this process in practice is Kroese v. General Steel Castings.
Corp., (3d Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 760 at 764-766, cert. den. 339 U.S. 983 (1950), discussed
in section III-A supra, at notes 82ff. And see Latrobe Elec. Steel Co. V'. Vascoloy-Ramet
Corp., (D.C. Del. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 347, where the feder~ court in Delaware stayed the
principal proceedings to give plaintiff time to bring action in the federal court in Illinois,
where jurisdiction over this defendant and the absent corporation could be obtained. If
plaintiff should fail to institute suit in Illinois, then this court would re-examine the
motion for dismissal for want of an indispensable party, but would not determine tha~
question now.
358 See note 330 supra.
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if the court is to make a meaningful determination at all, and yet
there appears to be no state court where jurisdiction over all persons can be obtained. Joinder of A in the federal court is impossible because the court's process stops at the state line359 or, at best
under a recent suggestion, 100 miles from the courthouse,360 or
because the statutory venue requirement cannot be met,361 or because the joinder would destroy jurisdiction by creating incomplete
diversity. At .present, if the court can formulate no decree which
will protect A's interests, plaintiff's claim is at dead end and will
remain there unless a timely change in location of his adversaries
or co-parties occurs. His predicament is the same as Robert Barrow's.362 This is the point at which diversity jurisdiction could
be of great assistance to litigants. Here it is that the federal courts
could furnish a desirable, unduplicated forum in diversity cases.
Yet, now, where the state court is impotent, so is the federal; and
Strawbridge v. Curtiss makes the area of federal impotence even
wider. At the precise point where most needed, federal diversity
jurisdiction is currently of no value.363
The problems of process and venue are amenable to legislative solution.364 It would not be novel to permit federal court
process to run across state lines; indeed that very thing now
happens in some cases not based on diversity, as, for example, in
cases under the Federal Interpleader Act365 and in suits to obtain
patents or relief against patent interference.366 And recently proposed was an amendment to the federal rules to permit out-of-state
359 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 (f).
360 Proposed (but rejected) amendments to rule 4 (f) would have permitted service
without the state if within 100 miles of the courthouse, as is the case with subpoenas under
present rule 45. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure
for the District Courts of the United States (1954).
36128 U.S.C. (1952) §1391 (a): "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on
diversity of citizenship may, except as othemise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." The most significant exception referred to is 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1655, the first paragraph of which permits venue in
actions to enforce liens on or claims to property or to remove clouds on title to be laid in
the district where the property is. See Blume, "Actions Quasi in Rem under Section 1655,
Title 28, U.S.C.," 50 MICH. L. REv. I (1951).
862 He of Shields v. Barrow, section III-A supra.
368 See Wechsler, "Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code," 13
LAW &: CoNTEM. PROB. 216 at 234 et seq. (1948); Barrett, "Venue and Service of Process in
the Federal Courts-Suggestions For Reform," 7 VAND. L. REv. ~08 at 634 (1954).
so~ See Barrett, note 363 supra, at 627 et seq.
865 49 StaL 1096 (1936), as amended, 63 Stat. 105 (1949), 28 U.S.C. (1952) §2361.
806 44 Stat. 1394 (1927), 35 U.S.C. (1952) §72 (a). Additional examples are listed in
Jackson, "Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," 45 CoL. L.
R.Ev. I at 23, n.92 (1945).
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service within 100 miles of the courthouse.367 Venue provisions,
being incapable of enlarging the jurisdiction of the court system,
could be altered in any suitable fashion within the jurisdictional
framework, subject only to the obvious requirement that the place
of trial have some reasonable connection with the parties or the
event.368 No decisions appear to cast any doubt on the propriety
of permitting venue to be laid in any district where any of the
parties resides, especially when the court is empowered to transfer
the cause to a more convenient forum, as under present section
1404 (a) of the Judicial Code.369
There is, however, some doubt whether legislative abrogation
of the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss would be
constitutional. Section 2 of Article III of the United States
Constitution provides that "The judicial power shall extend . . .
to controversies ... between citizens of different States. . . . "
The present provision in the Judicial Code which confers diversity
jurisdiction requires that the action be between "Citizens of different States."370 Language not materially different was said in
Strawbridge to mean "that each distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be sued,
in the federal courts. That is, that where the interest is joint, each
of the persons concerned in that interest must be competent to
sue, or liable to be sued, in those courts."371 All subsequent
Supreme Court pronouncements seem to affirm the Strawbridge
requirement: each plaintiff must be qualified by diversity to sue
each defendant in a federal court.372 Several of the cases have
suggested that an interpretation of the statute to permit incomplete
diversity would be beyond the constitutional authorization. ·For
example, Justice Curtis, in our much-cited case of Shields v. Barrow, said of an order which would sanction the addition of parties
367 See note 360 supra. Thus, process might have run across even two state boundaries, as, e.g., from New York City to Philadelphia.
368 See Jackson, "Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," 45
CoL. L. REv. 1 at 22 (1945), citing Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312
(1923) (Minnesota trial of imported cause of action between non-residents held precluded
by commerce clause).
369 62 Stat. 937 (1948).
370 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1332 (a) (1).
371 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 267 (1806).
372 Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 130 at 145 (1855); Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11
Wall. (78 U.S.) 172' (1871); Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. (85 U.S.)
553 (1874); Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457 (1879); Blake v. McKim, 103 U.S. 336 (1881);
Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U.S. 407 (1882); Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, 121 U.S. 631 (1887);
Smith v. Lyon, 133 U.S. 315 (1890); Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63
(1941).
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who would render diversity incomplete, "It is apparent that, if
it were in the power of a circuit court of the United States to make
and enforce orders like this, both the article of the constitution respecting the judicial power, and the act of congress conferring jurisdiction on the circuit courts, would be practically disregarded
in a most important particular.... No such power exists...." 373
It has been argued that in no case has the constitutional issue been
decided squarely, it being possible to place each holding on other
grounds; 374 but the close similarity between the constitutional
language and the statutory language and the hostile indications in
the cases lend considerable weight to the argument that the Strawbridge interpretation of the statute is the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution as well.
If it is true that Strawbridge is indicative of a constitutional
principle, there are nevertheless several devices curiously available
for circumventing it. For example, a class suit properly may be
lodged in a federal court if the representatives have the requisite
diversity from their antagonist even though some or all of the
other members of the class are citizens of the antagonist's own
state.376 The Delaware corporation whose stockholders, office
and entire business are in Arizona may nevertheless make use of
the federal courts in its litigation with Arizona residents. 376 As
noted already, federal rule 19 (b) runs counter to the spirit if not
the letter of Strawbridge. Also available is the device of intervention: if the intervenor's claim is deemed ancillary to the principal
litigation, intervention need not be supported by independent
jurisdictional grounds.377 When this principle is coupled with
873 17 How. (58 U.S.) 130 at 144 (1855). See also Blake v. McKim,
374 McGovney, "A Supreme Court Fiction," 56 HARv. L. REv. 853,

103 U.S. 336 (1881).
1090 at 1105 (1943).
See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 at 71 (1939). And it is argued that federal
interpleader provisions for a kind of incomplete diversity are indication that the prohibition is not constitutional. Keeffe, "Twenty-Nine Distinct Damnations of the Federal Practice," 7 VAND. L. REv. 636 at 654-655 (1954).
371i Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Shipley v. Pittsburgh
&: L.E.R.R., (W.D. Pa. 1947) 70 F. Supp. 870. See Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 at 64
(1885).
376 See Frankfurter, "Distribution of Judicial Powers between United States and State
Courts," 13 CoRN. L.Q. 499 at 523 (1928); I Cvc. OF FED. PRoc., 2d ed., §200 (1943). See,
generally, McGovney, "A Supreme Court Fiction," 56 HAR.v. L. REv. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943).
The most recent important attack on the effect of the corporate citizenship fiction on federal jurisdiction is the recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
note 352 supra, embodied in Representative Celler's bill, note 353 supra, that a corporation be deemed a citizen both of the state of its creation and of the state in which it has
its principal place of business. On the effect of multiple incorporation see Seavey v.
Boston &: Maine R.R., (1st Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 485; Frankfurter, supra this note.
877 Humble Oil &: Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., (5th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 191; Kentucky
Nat. Gas Corp. v. Duggins, (6th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 1011; Johnson v. Riverland Levee
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rule 19 (b) in an appropriate case, the complete diversity rule
comes a cropper, as strikingly illustrated by Drumright v. Texas
Sugarland Company.378 The Sugarland Company, a Kansas corporation, mortgaged land to Grand Lodge, an Oklahoma corporation. Later, Sugarland sold the land to Drumright and others for
cash plus a promise to pay off the mortgage. The buyers apparently were Texans, with the exception of one Oklahoman. The
buyers defaulted in their payments on the mortgage, and Sugarland
and Grand Lodge sued in a federal district court in Texas for
foreclosure, to have an equitable lien declared and enforced, or for
rescission, alternatively. Because federal jurisdiction was based
on diversity of citizenship the Oklahoma purchaser moved to dismiss the case for incomplete diversity. The court dismissed not
the case but only Grand Lodge as a plaintiff, holding that it was
not an indispensable party. 379 Thereupon, Grand Lodge filed a
petition to intervene in the cause; intervention was allowed. "The
Grand Lodge, as the holder of a mortgage on the land against
which an equitable lien in favor of the Sugarland Company was
asserted by the suit, had such an interest in that land as to make
permissible the assertion by intervention of the Grand Lodge's
rights under its mortgage."380 No jurisdictional problem was
deemed to exist. Thus, by the simple device of dismissal (or withdrawal381) of a party and subsequent intervention, one may avoid
the Strawbridge rule. There is much uncertainty as to when an
intervention must stand on its own jurisdictional feet and when it
may rely on the jurisdictional facts of the main case, 382 but in any
Dist., (8th Cir. 1941) II7 F. (2d) 7II; Glover v. McFaddin, (E.D. Tex. 1951) 99 F. Supp.
385. See American Bowling Supply Co. v. Al Martin, Inc., (D.C. Kan. 1951) 96 F. Supp.
35 at 37; American Union Ins. Co. v. Lowman Wine & Bottling Co., (W.D. Mo. 1950) 94
F. Supp. 774 at 776.

378 (5th Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 657.
379 "So far as the bill was one for the enforcement of the equitable rights of the Sugarland Company as the seller of said land, the holder of a mortgage on that land, which was
in existence at the time of the sale, was not an indispensable party, as the seller's rights
against the buyer could be adjudged and enforced without directly affecting the preexisting mortgage on the land or the holder of that mortgage. Sioux City Terminal R.
& W. Co. v. Trust Co. (C.C.A.) 82 F. 124.'' Id. at 658. Assuming that Grand Lodge was
merely "necessary," this is precisely the result which would obtain under present rule 19(b).
sso 16 F. (2d) 657 at 658.
381 By dictum, the court in Kentucky Nat. Gas Corp. v. Duggins, (6th Cir. 1948) 165
F. (2d) IOII, states clearly that employment of the intervention device to escape jurisdictional limitations, even as a deliberately chosen alternative to outright joinder, does not
defeat jurisdiction.
382 "As stated in all the textbooks, there is considerable confusion, if not conflict, in
the authorities." Sun Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., (S.D. Tex. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 658 at
663, revd., obviously on other grounds, sub nom. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co.,
(5th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 191. However, Professor Moore believes the cases can be
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case of the latter class the Strawbridge policy can be circumvented
by the Sugarland expedient.888
In the matter of the timing of the compulsory joinder
marshaled to support the following rules: "[l] Intervention under an absolute right, or
[2] under a discretionary right in an in rem proceeding, need not be supported by the
grounds of jurisdiction independent of those supporting the original action. [3] Intervention in an in personam action under a discretionary right must be supported by independent grounds of jurisdiction, except when the action is a class action." 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcnCE 139 (1950).
The third statement seems supportable. So-called discretionary intervention in an in
personam action ordinarily is tied to the principal litigation only by a common question
of law or fact. Federal rule 24 (b) (2). It represents an independent suit, and must possess
its own jurisdictional facts. Lacking diversity, intervention will be denied. Johnson v.
Riverland Levee Dist., (8th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 711; Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Thompson,
(E.D. Mo. 1948) 8 F.R.D. 96. Wichita R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm., 260 U.S. 48 (1922),
sometimes cited as contrary, was not strictly an in personam action. See Baltimore & O.
R.R. v. Thompson, supra this note, at 99.
Moore's second rule, that intervention under a discretionary right in an in rem
proceeding need not be supported by independent jurisdictional grounds, also finds some
basis in the cases, on the ground that the intervention is ancillary to the main case. Drumright v. Texas Sugarland Co., (5th Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 657; Golconda Petroleum Corp. v.
Petrol Corp., (S.D. Cal. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 23; cases cited in note 377 supra.
But real difficulty is encountered in the first class of cases mentioned, those where
intervention is "under an absolute right." This is due chiefly, one suspects, to the clear
error, embalmed in the federal rules, in assuming that-save the rare intervention of right
under a federal statute-there is any such thing as an absolute right to intervene. Rule
24 (a) purports to make intervention available of right "(2) when the representation of
the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is
or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in
the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof."
But the trial court still must determine whether representation of the applicant's interest
is inadequate and whether he may be bound by the judgment; this is a discretionary determination, involving findings both of fact and of law. Neither does the rule rob the
court of discretion in deciding whether the applicant is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution of property in the court's custody or control. Intervention in
these cases is not and cannot be of right until the preliminary determination is made.
This preliminary determination is substantial and is so serious a limitation on the "right"
as to make the use of the term misleading. It is true that in cases under rule 24 (a) the
court apparently is not authorized to take into account the possible delay or prejudice
to the principal action, whereas under rule 24 (b) it is directed to do so. Except for this
omission, subdivisions (2) and (3) of rule 24 (a) employ language closely similar to that
used when a court is determining the indispensability of a party. If in a given case the
tests be substantially the same, i.e., for permitting intervention and for finding indispensability, one is disturbed by the frequent statement that where the intervenor is an
indispensable party his improper citizenship will destroy the court's jurisdiction-a rule
partially at variance with Moore's attempted summary. Kentucky Nat. Gas Corp. v. Duggins, (6th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 1011; Charleston Nat. Bank v. Oberreich, (E.D. Ky. 1940)
34 F. Supp. 329. Compare Wichita R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm., 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922)
["Much less is such (diversity) jurisdiction defeated by the intervention, by leave of the
court, of a party whose presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between
the original parties.''] with Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., (5th Cir. 1951) 190
F. (2d) 191 at 197 ["To allow the State of Texas to intervene here would introduce a new
litigant, which is not an indispensable party and whose presence would destroy the jurisdiction of the court.•.•"].
883 The

Fifth. Circuit reaffirmed Sugarland in McComb v. McCormack, 159 F. (2d)

219 at 224-225 (1947).
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inquiry, also, it is revealing to compare federal diversity cases with
state (and fe~eral non-diversity) cases. Nicely illustrative of the
manner in which a federal diversity case may offer problems not
necessarily presented in non-diversity cases is Calcote v. Texas
Pacific Coal & Oil Company.384 On June I, 1939, Calcote and
others as lessors entered into a lease with Texas Pacific, giving it
the right to explore for oil, gas, and other minerals. The term of
the lease was ten years, with annual delay rentals of $60. The lessors
and the leased land were in Mississippi. The lessee was not qualified to do business in Mississippi as of the date of the lease; a Texas
corporation, it became domesticated in Mississippi on January 2,
1940. Thereafter, the lessors conveyed mineral •interests in the
land, subject to the lease, to several grantees, at least one of whom
was in Texas, one in New York, and several in Mississippi. These
grantees were given no right to bonuses or delay rentals; their participation in future leases was limited to a proportionate amount
of royalty payments under any such future lease, even as under
the existing agreement. In May of each year through 1944, delay
rentals were accepted by the lessors.
An action in a federal district court in Mississippi was then
instituted by the lessors to cancel the lease on the ground that it was
void when executed because of the lessee's non-qualification to do
business in. Mississippi. The lessee answered that the lease was
voidable merely and had been ratified by the lessors' acceptance of
delay rentals and by conveyances of the greater part of their royalty
interests after the lessee had qualified to do business in Mississippi.
The lessee filed a counterclaim, asking that its rights under the
lease be confirmed.
The district court gave judgment for defendant-lessee both
on the original bill and on defendant's counterclaim, and plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. At
no time-in the district court or in the circuit court-did either
party object to the nonjoinder of the lessors' grantees. Nevertheless, the majority in the circuit court felt the absence of the
grantees to be a complete barrier to maintenance of the action,
and the case was reversed and remanded to the district court with
direction to add parties. In view of the fact that joinder of the
grantees would destroy diversity, the court's action was tantamount to an order of dismissal.
·
.
The circuit court said that "In diversity cases, the question of
384

(5th Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 216, cert. den. 329 U.S. 782 (1946).
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indispensable parties is inherent in the issue of federal jurisdiction,
the determination of which should never await a decision on the
merits if the complaint states a cause of action."385 Stating also
that the "true test is the situation that existed before and not after
entry of the final judgment"386 and that this "decisive" jurisdictional issue is "on the threshold"387 of the appeal, the court thus
indicated clearly that where its jurisdiction depends upon the establishment of diversity of citizenship of the parties, it will inquire
into the question of compulsory joinder of absent parties at the
outset if the problem is recognized. It is plain als9 that the inquiry
will be made by the court on its motion, if necessary, and at whatever stage in the action the problem first calls itself to the court's
attention.
It cannot be denied that there is much that is sound in the
court's view that in the presence of a "jurisdictional question" (a
more nearly appropriate use of that phrase here than is usual in
joinder cases388) the inquiry into the necessity of joinder cannot
be put aside to abide the outcome of the litigation-to stand if
the decision does not affect the interests of absent parties adversely,
to fall if it does. Any other view would involve the court as often
as not in the wasteful process of presiding over a lengthy course of
litigation proving ultimately to have been void ab initio. "A precarious jurisdiction that limits the scope of judicial decision on
the merits cannot be entertained."389 So long as the federal courts
are empower~d to adjudge some controversies solely because the
parties are from different states, the necessity of joining another
person whose presence will destroy diversity is a question which
ought to be determined at the earliest possible moment.
But when the argument in the preceding paragraph has been
made, what has been added to the general principles applicable to
all these joinder cases? Can it not be said that in all actions, diversity cases merely included, the determination of whether the
absent person will be affected adversely cannot logically be put
off to abide the event of the action? If the action may so prejudice
the absent A as to be "wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience"390 (a question of fact), then A's joinder should be re3811 157 F. (2d) 216 at 218.
386lbid.
387lbid.
388 See text in section II-A supra, at notes 15-17.
389 Calcote v. Texas Pacific Coal &: Oil Co., (5th Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 216 at 218,
cert. den. 329 U.S. 782 (1946).
890 Curtis, J., in Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. (58 U.S.) lllO at 139 (1854).
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quired-whether the court be state or federal has no bearing. If
in the diversity case a decision to require joinder effectually
terminates the action by leading to a destruction of diversity and
thus of jurisdiction, so also in non-diversity cases a requirement
of joinder may as effectually bring an end to the case if the absent
person is not within the court's reach. The process and effect are
not fundamentally different in the two circumstances. Destruction of diversity is not part and parcel of the party issue, which is
practically the same in state and federal cases. Ouster of jurisdiction is merely a consequence of a particular holding, already arrived at, on the party issue.
This should be qualified by saying that the possible mortality
inherent in the court's determination of the party question may
be taken into account in deciding that very question. This is
federal rule 19 (b)391 again, but it represents the desirable state
procedure as well. The court should ask of those present: Why
do you want to handle this without the grantees when they won't
be bound (of course) and could relitigate? Whether or not the
court should continue will depend largely on the answer to that
question. If the answer suggests the probability of a multiplicity
of suits, then joinder presumably should be required. Here, there
seems little likelihood of litigation by the Calcote grantees. But
the court's reasoning moves in the other direction. The not unreasonable assumption that the grantees and the lessors had similar interests might indicate that cancellation, sought by the lessors,
would be to the grantees' benefit as well392 (perhaps, for example,
because of the availability of a more lucrative lease were they free
to enter into it). Yet the court stated that a cancellation of the
lease would adversely affect the grantees since it would annul
their "vested rights." 393 If it be thought to follow therefrom that
confirmation of those vested rights, as prayed in defendant's
counterclaim, would not adversely affect the interests of the
grantees, the court has an answer for that too, stating that "The
cancellation of the present lease would destroy their vested interest
391 See

text at notes 329 et seq. supra.
"Doubtless all will admit that the [lessors] have only an undivided one-fourth of
one-eighth royalty in the minerals so long as the present lease is in force and effect. It is
a fractional mineral interest in the whole tract distinct from their contingent reversionary
interest. It would not be possible to cancel this lease without destroying the· undivided
three-fourths royalty interest therein owned by the above named individuals who have
not been made parties to this suit. [But query.] .•. The lessors and their grantees were,
technically and beneficially, joint owners of a common property, each with an undivided
interest in every particle of the minerals." 157 F. (2d) 216 at 219.
393 Id. at 219.
392
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in praesenti, whereas a declaration of its validity would either
destroy absolutely their vested interest in futuro or postpone the
enjoyment of it indefinitely. Vested interests of absent parties,
therefore, will be directly and vitally affected regardless of the
outcome of this litigation."394 That an adverse or injurious395
effect is inevitable may be doubted. Quite possibly the trouble is
that the court lacked the facts which would be elicited by the inquiry as to why plaintiffs and defendant both were willing to
proceed in the grantees' absence. The lack of those facts may
have required that the case be remanded. But the court did not
say so. The absence of any objection by the parties themselves
to nonjoinder should not be dispositive of the issue. Failure to
object may be collusive or ignorant, or the result of a simple
mistake. At best, the failure may be an indication that the parties
are satisfied to proceed as they are because they anticipate no subsequent suit by the absent ones. However, the court can do better
than draw inferences from the parties' silence; it can and should
ask them why they choose to proceed thus.
The Calcote decision seems additionally unfortunate in that
it was on the appellate level. The kind of inquiry just suggested
is designed for the trial court's use; once the case passes that tribunal and arrives in an appellate court, there ought to be the most
compelling of reasons before dismissing (in effect) and on the
court's own motion.396 If a case has been tried and is on appeal
with a result which is supportable in law and which does not adversely affect the interests of the absent party3 97 whose nonjoinder
is being urged as a ground for reversal, more, rather than less,
vain judicial work is required. It would be unfair, however, not
to point out the pertinent consideration of discipline, i.e., that if
the case were not remanded, trial courts might go right on entertaining jurisdiction in cases where that jurisdiction may prove
baseless ultimately. Calcote is a warning to judges and lawyers
alike, at a client's expense.
394 Id. at 221. "It would be hard to find a better illustration of indispensable parties
than is afforded by the instant case." Id. at 220.
395 Both the majority and minority opinions use the phrase "injuriously affect"; only
the minority uses "adversely affect."
396 This is not to suggest that a court should be limited to those joinder issues raised
by the parties; but it does suggest that if it is not clear that an absent person will be
harmed there should be reluctance to dismiss after completion of the entire trial process.
397 Concededly, this fact is not clear in the Calcote case. The court concluded that
such interests would be "vitally" affected, which in context obviously meant adversely.
Elsewhere the court used "injuriously." The opinion is lacking in facts to support the
conclusion.
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Judge Hutcheson's dissent398 is refreshing in its implicit acknowledgment that so-called indispensable parties are not mevitably indispensable in the dictionary sense of that word.
"The truth of the matter is that the classification of parties
as necessary or indispensable depends entirely upon the particular facts of each case. . . . Further, though some of the
decisions exhibit more than a little confusion about it, it is
undeniable that the error in non-joinder of parties, either
necessary or indispensable, is not jurisdictional. . .. Finally,
it is clearly settled that even if a party is indispensable,399 his
absence from a suit will not be ground for dismissing it or
reversing a judgment in it, if it clearly appears that no relief
can be, or has been, obtained in the suit which injuriously
affects his interest."400
As suggested earlier, the majority in the Calcote case seems to

be concerned primarily with what it calls a "precarious jurisdiction," not wanting the court to spend time dealing with litigation
which may prove to have been entertained erroneously. And yet
the Supreme Court, in Bourdieu v. Pacific Oil Company, 401 held
that an inquiry into the indispensability of a party would be a
waste of time where the bill failed to state a cause of action.402 If
the question of indispensability is indeed liminal, a court would
be without jurisdiction even to determine the issue of whether a
cause of action is stated. Yet this would be unnecessarily strict.
The Calcote majority opinion agrees, but it seeks to distinguish
the Bourdieu rule by stating that an examination into indispensability in the Bourdieu circumstances would be a gratuitous inquiry, and improper under the rule that a court will not concern
itself with vain things. Instead, it is deemed perfectly proper to
398157 F. (2d) 216 at 223.
899 Judge Hutcheson's failure to place "indispensable" in quotation marks as used in
this sentence reminds of the familiar dialogue in chapter six of "Through the Looking
Glass" which follows Humpty Dumpty's assertion that he used "glory" to mean "nice
knock-down argument."
·" 'But "glory" doesn't mean "a nice knock-down argument,"' Alice objected.
" 'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.'
" 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different
things.'
" 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master-that's all.' "
400 157 F. (2d) 216 at 223. _
401299 U .s. 65 (1936).
402 Cf. West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 582 at
592-593, cert. den. 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
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dismiss, upon having entertained the case for that purpose; and
no distinction is drawn between those cases in which joinder of
the absent person would have ousted federal jurisdiction and those
in which it would not. In a case where it is obvious that no cause
of action is stated, there is no difficulty in dismissing quickly, and
the absent person, no matter how plainly his interests would be
affected by the outcome of the suit were it to go to judgment on
the merits, can have no objection since his interests are not affected
at all by abortive litigation. It is not always readily apparent,
however, whether a bill states a cause of action. Occasionally a
case will go all the way to a court of last resort on the issue of
whether the facts offered by plaintiff provide, in point of law,
grounds for the relief sought. But there is in the Bourdieu rule,
which is recognized and distinguished by the Calcote majority and
relied upon by the minority, nothing to draw any line between
the case of the obviously bad bill and the one which is only
arguably bad. That argument may take the case through several
courts and may be resolved ultimately in favor of the plaintiff,
with the results that the joinder issue thereupon must be faced.
Conceivably, more effort will have been expended in vain than
if the party joinder question had been disposed of first.
However, a distinction suggests itself, a distinction which may
justify a difference in results. If the question is whether the result
to be reached on a presumably good cause of action will or will
not affect the absent person adversely, the possibility of the prejudicial result is rather definite and foreseeable. If, however, the
question is one of the validity of a cause of action and the initial
ruling, in the trial court, is one of dismissal, that issue and that
alone will be appealed. Affirmance on appeal renders the joinder
question moot, whereas reversal will normally be followed by an
opportunity to plead over (if, indeed, that was not given and
availed of in the trial court). Upon the statement of a cause of
action which the trial judge feels can be sustained, the joinder
issue can then be considered.
The view that failure to join an interested person is nonprejudicial if the relief given did not harm him came under heavy
attack by the Fifth Circuit in Young v. Powell. 403 The relief asked
for, not that granted, in the trial court was held to determine indispensability. In this view, the possibility of a decree which
4-03

179 F. (2d) 147 (1950), cert. den. 339 U.S. 948 (1950).
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would have an adverse effect upon an absent person would override the fact that the relief actually given benefited instead of
harmed him. In effect, a person is indispensable if his interests
will be affected, whether favorably or injuriously makes no difference. To the argument that the relief given inured to the benefit of absent persons and thus excused nonjoinder, the court responded that to permit such a distinction to prevail would make
of the indispensable party rule a "delusion and a snare," and that
the
"whole doctrine and the equitable basis on which it rests
would be gone by the board.
"Such view would permit the continual harassment of
the defendant by successive suits brought singly by interested parties, each in the interest of them all, for cancellation
with no protection, in case the defendant wins, from successive suits by the others who had not been made parties,
while in case he lost in the first suit, his complaint that he
ought not to have suffered a judgment in favor of persons
who were not sued,404 would be met by the cynical view,
'Well, those who ought to have been in the suit haven't suffered because their interests have prevailed, and having lost
the suit, it doesn't lie in your mouth to complain that they
got the benefit of a suit to which they were not made parties.' " 405
Does the common sense of this statement cut the ground from
beneath criticism of the Calcote decision? If. so, it is odd to find
Judge Hutcheson writing the dissent in Calcote and the opinion
of a unanimous court in Young. Hutcheson himself suggests, but
does not spell out, the distinction.
"The doctrine of indispensable parties as set down in
Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. at page 198, 6 L. Ed. 599, is
equitable in origin and result, set down carefully and as carefully maintained, there has never been any basis for the view
that where the want of indispensable parties has been timely
called to the attention of the trial judge, and he has denied
a motion to dismiss, such want can be regarded as cured by
the fact relied on here, that a judgment has been granted in
plaintiff's suit in favor of the absent parties."406
404 The court apparently alludes to persons whose interests align them with plaintiff,
although if they failed to come in voluntarily and were brought in by plaintiff to make
possible a full adjudication they nominally would be defendants.
405 179 F. (2d) 147 at 152.
406 Ibid. Emphasis supplied.
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In Young, defendant mad~ timely objection in the trial court and
at every appropriate point in the course of the litigation; in Calcote, no objection came from the parties themselves at any stage,
including the hearing before the circuit court. This bears upon
the opportunity which plaintiff had in the trial court to justify the
nonjoinder. In Calcote, the matter is new and to reverse without
an affirmative showing of injury to those absent is to express a concern beyond the dictates of necessity. If it can be shown that the
absent persons have been unharmed in fact, or even benefited, it
seems foolish to remand or dismiss the case. In Young, however,
defendant has been objecting every step of the way, with ample
opportunity to plaintiff to show the propriety of nonjoinder.
When an appellate court believes plaintiff has failed, a reversal
may be appropriate even though the evolution of the case has left
unharmed those not joined.
E.

In Short

The essence of all that precedes is that questions of required
joinder should be resolved less and less on the basis of pat formulations which provide generalized characterizations of parties, and
more and more on case by case consideration of the interrelated
and sometimes competing interests in reducing litigation, minimizing harassment of defendants, protecting absent persons, providing a forum for bona fide claims, and the like. If it be deduced
from any portion of the cases discussed that criticism of mechanical
solutions based on (unrealistic) labels is an attack on a straw
man, and that in fact the courts now actually decide these questions
rationally, then it is not too much to ask that the obfuscating use
of the labels be abandoned and that opinions indicate that facts
have been sought and examined which bear on the various interests
presented.
If one accepts Dean Pound's theory that our legal system in
development alternates between strict rule and formula on one
hand and informality and judicial discretion on the other, and that
contemporary jurisprudence is in one of the liberal, more flexible
eras, our thesis is, at very least, riding the. pendulum; and one
gains if only from realizing that labels no longer determine outcomes. It may not be fruitless to catalog cases to show, e.g., that
courts often call junior mortgagees necessary or indispensable in
foreclosure suits, or that joint obligees are required to sue together; most cases fit into the general pattern. But no lawyer
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worth his calling can afford to forget for one moment that such
lists give rise to little more than a presumption. There is no
person so intimately related to matter in litigation between others,
that there cannot be circumstances which will justify proceeding
in his absence. The descriptive term assigned to him is irrelevant
to the process of decision.

